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Abstract 
 
Renewable energy is increasingly gaining currency as a sustainable substitute for fossil fuels. Iceland 
has been framed as one of the world’s renewable energy success cases and the country’s renewable 
energy production has multiplied in recent decades. 
This thesis approaches Iceland’s renewable energy sector from a critical perspective. It investigates 
the dominant discourse around the expansion of the energy sector in Iceland and its social and 
environmental consequences. The investigation was carried out by applying Hajer’s argumentative 
discourse analysis. Empirical material was qualitatively collected through conducting 17 semi-
structured interviews and analysing publicly available text-documents, radio and TV broadcasts. 
Quantitative data were gathered through a questionnaire and by reviewing official statistics. The 
material was analysed in light of Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony. Additional concepts were 
employed to critically highlight flaws in the dominant discourse. These concepts are: Ecological 
modernisation, carbon fetishism and depoliticization. 
The results show that a) the dominant discourse promotes an expansion of the energy sector at the 
expense of Icelandic nature, b) it does so – among other things – by contrasting capitalism's notion of 
scarcity with the notion of abundance attributed to Iceland's natural resources, c) the dominant 
discourse is heavily influenced by ecological modernisation (EM) and uncritically adopts its rationale 
and also its shortcomings, and d) the dominant discourse preserves its hegemonic status despite its 
inherent contradictions and negative side-effects by attempting to conceal conflicts over resource 
utilisation and by marginalising critical views. Despite the full adoption of EM as guiding principle for 
the expansion of the energy sector Iceland has not experienced the fulfilment of the promises that 
come with EM. In other words, a reconciliation of environment and economy has not taken place as 
is demonstrated by Iceland's growing CO2 emissions and environmental degradation while 
companies in the energy sector experience ongoing financial difficulties.  
This thesis concluded that environmental politics cannot be reduced to argumentative struggles, as 
Hajer suggests. Alternative discourses can only gain ground if the cultural hegemony of the dominant 
discourse is met with resistance on all levels of social life; in thoughts, norms and beliefs. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, climate change has become one of the most pressing concerns of our times and 
reached the top of the international agenda. According to the latest assessment report (AR5) of the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the “warming of the climate is unequivocal” and 
“many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia” (IPCC, 2014a: 4). The 
scientific evidence further establishes that this development is driven by human activity and will pose 
great risks to both human and natural systems (IPCC, 2014b).  
Increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere, particularly carbon dioxide 
(CO2), are the main drivers of anthropogenic climate change (IPCC, 2014a). In a 2009 article 
Rockström et al. identified a set of planetary boundaries that mark ‘a safe operating space for 
humanity’. According to the authors three boundaries have already been transgressed, with climate 
change being one of them (2009).  
The energy sector is the largest contributor to global GHG emissions (IPCC, 2012). Transforming the 
world’s energy system towards lower GHG emissions is therefore critical for combatting climate 
change (Ibid.). In a Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation 
(SPREN) of the IPCC, it is stated that “*r+enewable energy sources have a large potential to displace 
emissions of greenhouse gases from the combustion of fossil fuels and thereby to mitigate climate 
change” (IPCC, 2012).  
Iceland is the world’s largest producer of energy per capita (Orkustofnun, n.d.-f) and almost 100% of 
all its electricity comes from renewable energy, i.e. hydropower and geothermal energy 
(HGE)(Orkustofnun, n.d.-h, 2014a).1 It is recognised as a success case in the harnessing of renewable 
energy (IPCC, 2012; Lund, Freeston, & Boyd, 2011). 
However, Iceland’s energy production is not unproblematic. Large scale harnessing of geothermal 
energy has caused environmental degradation and resource depletion (Arnórsson, 2012; Axelsson, 
Gunnlaugsson, Jónasson, & Ólafsson, 2010). Secondly, the lifespan of the country’s biggest 
hydropower projects is limited and uncertain because the reservoirs that are built to regulate water 
flow will fill up with sediments as they are fed by glacial rivers (M. Jóhannsson & Magnúsdóttir, 2002; 
NPA, 2000). Additionally, energy production in Iceland often involves intrusions into areas that have 
previously been unspoilt or free from human activity, particularly the central highlands (Master Plan, 
                                                          
1
 Iceland’s total energy production from these two sources in 2013 was 46.3 Petajoule (PJ) from hydropower 
and 170.7 PJ from geothermal energy, or ca. 85% of total primary energy use
1
. Almost 100% of the electricity 
production, or 17.5 TWh in 2012, comes from HGE.  
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2011; Þórhallsdóttir, 2002). A rapid expansion of the energy sector in the past two decades has 
therefore garnered criticism from a growing number of actors who claim Icelandic nature should be 
protected (G. P. Ólafsson, 2007). Thus, there is a tension between the expansion of the green energy 
economy and environmental protection in Iceland. An integrated systems perspective which takes 
into consideration the impacts of renewable energy is important to problematize ‘green’ energy.  
Historically, Icelandic authorities and publicly-owned energy companies have supported the 
expansion of the sector while protection concerns have been raised by NGOs, scientists and 
increasingly by the public (Karlsdóttir, 2010). In many/several/a number of cases the struggles about 
energy projects have been won by the proponents of energy projects, thus affecting sites that hold 
high environmental and cultural value.  
1.1 Aims and Research Questions 
In light of the above, the aim of this thesis is to study the discourse on energy in Iceland and uncover 
its normative commitments. I will attempt to show that a dominant discourse is defined by a 
particular way of seeing and understanding the world, which leaves little room for alternative 
approaches to issues of energy and nature protection. This hegemonic position of this discourse, I 
will argue, has fulfilled a key role in the development of the Icelandic energy sector, influenced 
political decision-making and served to conceal or suppress conflicts.  
Secondly, I aim to locate the development of the energy sector in Iceland with respect to 
sustainability and renewable energy transformation. I take a critical perspective to understand the 
sustainability of renewable energy in Iceland and its socio-environmental impacts. 
Throughout this work, I am guided by the following research questions: 
RQ 1. What is the dominant discourse on energy in Iceland? 
 
RQ 2. How has the dominant discourse been realised in the development of a 
renewable energy sector in Iceland? 
 
RQ 3. Which are the most prominent entry-points for a critique of the dominant 
discourse? 
 
RQ 4. Are there any indicators for where Iceland might be heading in the future?  
 
RQ 1 forms the foundation of this work while RQ 2 addresses the material effects of the dominant 
discourse. RQ 3 investigates the potential for critique of the dominant discourse, finally, RQ 4 opens 
up the debate on future directions in energy development in Iceland.  
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1.2 Position in Sustainability Science 
Sustainability science is attentive to the reciprocal relationship between nature and society and 
studies the complex interactions between these two systems (Clark & Dickson, 2003; Perrings, 2007). 
My thesis sits within this research agenda and addresses society’s responses to one of the key 
challenges of sustainability science, namely climate change (Jerneck, Olsson, Ness, & Anderberg, 
2011).  
I take a reflective position on climate change mitigation by offering a critical perspective on the 
renewable energy sector. I show how underlying dynamics of discourse and power shape choices, 
regardless of scientific knowledge and environmental concerns. I thus take a critical approach to 
research (Jerneck et al., 2011) by questioning the implicit justifications of current institutionalised 
responses to climate change.  
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2. Methodology  
2.1 Analytical Approach and Structure 
As my research questions indicate, the focus of my research is on discourse and its role in shaping 
reality. Therefore, discourse analysis becomes an obvious analytical approach. I have chosen to 
follow the framework provided by argumentative discourse analysis (ADA) as developed by Maarten 
Hajer (1995). ADA and its focus on story-lines, discourse-coalitions and discursive hegemony is 
particularly useful as I use them to unveil inherent power relations within the prevailing discourse. 
For a further discussion of ADA, see Appendix III.  
ADA (Coffey & Marston, 2013) has been criticised for being insensitive or ignorant of the wider 
context of society and overlooking the influence non-discursive aspects of life can have on 
perceptions and norms in society. In view of that, I will, throughout my analysis and discussion, 
compliment ADA with theoretically informed concepts in order to gain a firmer grounding for my 
findings.  
2.2 Ontological and Epistemological Considerations 
I am guided by the ontological perspective that social actors continuously create and recreate the 
social structure they inhabit (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). This thesis thus follows the constructivist 
tradition, distinguishing between the Real World and our perception of it (2012). This stance does 
not equal denying the existence of material phenomena external to our minds – in fact, I see in 
constructivism an honest recognition of materiality – but maintains that these phenomena ‘never 
speak for themselves’ and are always made sense of by us (Bettini, 2013).  
This work is shaped by a view of knowledge as socially situated and intersubjective; created, 
obtained and given meaning through interaction (Moses & Knutsen, 2012). 
2.3 Research Strategy and Methods of Data Collection 
This research is inductive in character as it seeks to generate a new understanding of a particular 
topic (Bryman, 2008), namely the implicit assumptions underlying the Icelandic energy sector. It 
applies mixed methods of data collection, complementing the main qualitative data with quantitative 
data (Ibid.) in order to link the discursive and the material elements of the Icelandic energy sector 
together through triangulation. 
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The major sources of empirical data were documents, gathered through a review of academic and 
non-academic literature, and 17 semi-structured interviews. While documents provided an 
authoritative source of information, semi-structured interviews offered a more flexible, open-minded 
engagement with the discourse on energy in Iceland (Bryman, 2008). Interviewees were selected by 
purposive sampling (Ibid.) based on the roles they occupied within the energy sector or the 
environmental movement in Iceland, or based on some expertise they had to offer.  
I generated supportive quantitative data through a self-completion questionnaire, and gathered 
quantitative data by reviewing statistics on the energy sector. Interviews and questionnaire was 
conducted in Icelandic. I translated the quotes that appear in the thesis from Icelandic to English and 
other translations are also mine, unless mentioned otherwise. 
Data collection and analysis took place in three main stages. During the initial stage, the focus of the 
research was established with the aid of a broad literature review, focusing specifically on the 
discursive elements of energy and environmental concerns in Iceland. Secondly, I conducted 
fieldwork in Reykjavík, Iceland, from February 21st to March 8th, where I did my interviews and 
carried out the questionnaire. The third and final stage involved analysing data from the field, which 
was done concurrently with a further review of literature in order to strengthen the theoretical 
framing of my analysis. See Appendix I for the questionnaire in English, the main results and 
information on sampling. See Appendix II for the interview guide in English and detailed information 
on the interviews.  
Throughout data collection and interviews, I investigated three illustrative cases of energy 
development in Iceland to address the material expansion of the energy sector.  
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Table 1. After analysing the interviews, I categorised my interviewees as either narrative critics or narrative 
supporters. Although there were some overlapping views and concerns among narrative critics and narrative 
supporters, my final criteria for the division was whether people were critical of the underlying premises of the 
Icelandic energy sector (narrative critics) or not (narrative supporters). This I deduced e.g. from their 
perception of conflicts and trade-offs between energy development and nature protection, and their views of 
what the future of energy development in Iceland should be. This table presents only the names of the 
interviewees and the position they hold. See Appendix II for more detail. 
 
Narrative Critics Narrative Supporters  
Guðmundur Hálfdanarson Historian Ragnheiður Elín Árnadóttir 
Minister of Industry 
and Commerce 
Stefán Arnórsson Geochemist Helga Barðadóttir 
Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce 
Árni Finnsson INCA, President JG 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Guðmundur I. 
Guðbrandsson 
Landvernd, CEO ES 
Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce 
Þorbjörg S. Bakke Grugg Guðni A. Jóhannesson 
Orkustofnun, Director 
General 
Svandís Svavarsdóttir 
Previous Minister of 
Environment; MP 
Kristinn Einarsson Orkustofnun 
Þóra Ellen Þórhallsdóttir Master Plan; botanist Ragnheiður Ólafsdóttir Landsvirkjun 
Stefán Gíslason 
Master Plan; env. 
consultant 
Óli G. B. Sveinsson Landsvirkjun 
  Kjartan Sigurjónsson Landsnet 
  Ketill Sigurjónsson Askja Energy Ltd. 
 
2.4 Limitations to Study 
First of all, this thesis is limited in scope due to time constraints and word limits. Many issues could 
have been pursued further and clarified in more detail. For example, I could not analyse in-depth the 
role of all the actors in the discourse on energy in Iceland (i.e. the discourse-coalition, see chapter 5). 
I chose to focus on those that I identified as key-actors, who also have direct influence on public 
policies in Iceland.  
My position as an ‘insider’ in Iceland affects the research to some extent. As an Icelander I had 
preconceived ideas and assumptions about the research topic before I started working on this thesis. 
Being aware of this, I have attempted to be critical of my potential biases. However, it has also been 
valuable to know the cultural context of Iceland and speak the language. Furthermore, a great deal of 
the data I build on is in Icelandic, which is particularly challenging as language and the use of it is 
central in my analysis. It is inevitable that some subtleties of language get lost in translation. 
Interpretive research has a clear subjective component to it. My own values have inevitably coloured 
the direction of this thesis and my selection of data.  
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I have chosen to discuss two modes of energy production in this thesis, geothermal energy and 
hydropower. These are two very different physical systems and their use as energy sources entails 
different scientific and technical challenges and limitations. However, they are both considered to be 
renewable energy sources and thus are treated similarly in Icelandic policies and strategies on 
energy, they are both used to generate electricity for heavy industry, they figure together in public 
and political debates on energy and environment and the vocabulary associated with them is very 
similar. I therefore judged it more coherent to address both of them for the purposes of this thesis.  
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3. Environmental Discourse on Sustainability and Renewable Energy: 
Theoretical Perspectives  
The following section is divided into four parts. First of all, I explain the notion of discourse in this 
thesis, particularly in the context of environmental politics. Then I introduce the concept of cultural 
hegemony which is central in my analysis and discussion of discourses. After that I introduce 
ecological modernisation (EM). Due to its substantial influence on environmental policies today 
(Christoff, 1996), I present EM as the current hegemonic discourse in environmental politics. Later 
(chapter 5.1.5), I link it to the discourse on energy in Iceland. Finally, I introduce concepts that I use 
to criticize the hegemonic discourse of EM (chapter 5.3) and the discourse on energy in Iceland 
(chapters 5.3 and 6.1).  
3.1 Environmental Politics as Discourse 
Broadly defined, discourse denotes a shared meaning of phenomena that serve to discipline and 
frame actions, norms and beliefs (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001; Bäckstrand & 
Lövbrand, 2006). Hajer (1995: 44) has further defined discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities.” This insight 
emphasises the nexus of institutions and agency in creating and transforming discourses. My 
understanding of discourse in this thesis and my approach to discourse analysis are informed by this 
understanding. Thus, I look for the reproduction of discourse at the institutional level, e.g. in policy 
documents, but also at the level of agency, e.g. in the worldviews of powerful actors.  Secondly, 
discourse is not just shaped by practices, but also embedded in power relations and, as such, an 
important vehicle for knowledge-creation and agenda setting. Discourse can therefore serve to 
empower certain actors and favour certain descriptions of reality while marginalising other actors 
and alternative worldviews (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006). In view of this, I aim in my analysis to 
uncover which worldviews and actors become dominant and why.  
Maarten Hajer (1995: 1) described environmental discourse as “an astonishing collection of claims 
and concerns brought together by a great variety of actors.” It is fragmented and contradictory at 
times, demonstrated e.g. by the innumerable working definitions of sustainable development. He 
also argues that environmental conflicts revolve essentially around the interpretation of 
environmental problems, and not whether they exist or not.  
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This understanding directs the attention of the researcher beyond studying political barriers to 
change towards inquiring into how environmental problems get defined, what definitions gain 
ground and what political consequences follow (Hajer, 1995). Environmental politics are thus seen as 
dependent on the “specific social constructions of environmental problems” (Ibid.: 2). This also 
means that in the process of finding solutions to environmental problems we in fact re-define these 
phenomena and reduce their complexity to a manageable scale. 
In this thesis, I do not use the term narrative analytically, but as a referent for a particular story-line. 
Hajer (1995: 56) defines story-lines as “a generative sort of narrative”. Thus, the green-energy 
narrative is a story-line, and story-lines are a part of discourses. Arguably, I could have used the term 
story-line instead of narrative to emphasis its analytical status. The main reason for not doing that is 
simply that I had started using the term green-energy narrative before I became familiar with Hajer’s 
concept of story-line.  
3.2 Cultural Hegemony 
The concept of cultural hegemony, as developed by the Marxist Antonio Gramsci, has found wide 
proliferation in the social sciences (Ekers, Loftus, & Mann, 2009). Cultural hegemony is useful in my 
thesis to understand how a particular discourse on energy became hegemonic in Iceland and how it 
remains hegemonic.  
Cultural hegemony denotes a form of domination or leadership of society by a ruling-class that 
manipulates norms and belief-systems to secure political, social and economic order that benefits 
the ruling-class. Hegemony signifies the universal adoption of the norms and beliefs of the ruling-
class by other social classes. This condition is established through a combination of coercion and 
consent, which explains why civil society might perceive the current socio-political order as 
favourable to everyone while it in fact only benefits the ruling-class (Callinicos, 2007; Ekers et al., 
2009). This helps explain why social or institutional order that reproduces injustices can persist.  
In Gramsci’s thought, power is not confined to any one sphere of social life but simultaneously acts in 
the spheres of the economic, cultural and political, none of which can stand in isolation (Ekers et al., 
2009). A study of hegemony must take this into account and look for the reproduction of hegemony 
not just in conventional terrains of domination but also in “the social life of thought – norms, 
morality, common sense” (Mann, 2009). 
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3.3 Ecological Modernisation: The fix from within 
“The dirty and ugly industrial caterpillar will transform into a[n] ecological butterfly.” 
Joseph Huber 
Ecological Modernisation (EM) emerged in the 1980s as concept that has been defined differently by 
different scholars as technological innovation, policy response, or belief system (Berger, Flynn, Hines, 
& Johns, 2001; Christoff, 1996; Jänicke, 2007). It falls under the paradigm of weak sustainability, 
which is based on the notion of substitutability of natural capital with economic capital (Faran, 2010). 
EM is premised on the idea that ecology and the economy can be reconciled in the quest for 
sustainability (Brand, 2010; Jänicke, 2007; APJ Mol & Spaargaren, 2000). It holds that the main 
challenge of sustainability is locating spaces for feasible action “within the context of existing 
institutions and power structures and continued economic growth” (Gouldson & Sullivan, 2012: 116). 
EM thus marks a break from the mainstream view in the wake of the publication of Limits to Growth 
in 1972 that a radical reorganisation of society’s institutions was necessary for achieving ecological 
balance (Arthur Mol, 2003).  
As a technological adjustment, the process of EM denotes technological eco-innovation to bring 
about environmental improvement, a form of eco-rationalisation that adapts the market and 
industry to the challenges brought by environmental degradation (Christoff, 1996). Jänicke (2007) 
has framed it as a form of creative destruction whereby old patterns and forms of the previously 
destructive industry are replaced by new and environmentally-friendly ones. In this sense, EM has a 
narrow industrial focus (Christoff, 1996).  
The appropriate tools and measures to address environmental degradation that EM suggests reside 
within the modern capitalistic system and are based on internalising costs of environmental damage, 
such as pollution (Panayotou, 1994). This is further founded on the notion of decoupling of 
environmental pressures from economic growth and resource use (Jänicke & Lindemann, 2010; 
Simonis, 1989). This decoupling is to be achieved through technological innovation and subsequent 
“greening” of industrial production and consumption processes. Declining energy and material 
intensity in OECD countries in the last three decades and improvements in resource efficiency are 
seen as a promising indicator for the success EM inspired policies can bring about (Jackson, 2009). 
Thus, Jänicke claims that no alternative approaches have the same potential “to radically reduce the 
environmental burden of industrial growth” (2007: 563). 
Under EM, national government and the state have a supporting role in environmental reform and 
links between environmental and economic policies are strengthened. Jänicke (2007) and Jänicke 
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and Lindemann (2010) call for a turn from government to a more flexible, decentralised governance, 
privatisation and less market-intervention.  
The proponents of EM nonetheless recognise that technical solutions to environmental degradation 
face certain limits. Jänicke (2007) acknowledges the dilemma of the rebound-effect, i.e. the 
neutralising of environmental improvements by economic growth, and the resistance to reform by 
so-called ‘modernisation losers’, i.e. powerful big-polluters such as old industrial companies that face 
lowering profits due to environmental reform. He (Ibid.) also acknowledges actual policy outcomes 
have not been impressive under EM and it therefore has to be complimented with some structural 
reform. 
3.4 Critique from Alternative Spaces 
In this section I present theoretical concepts that offer valuable entry-points for a critique of EM and 
the discourse on energy in Iceland. These considerations will be employed in the Analysis together 
with ADA and in the Discussion as an overarching theoretical guide. I have arrived at these concepts 
inductively after studying the discourse on renewable energy in Iceland.  
3.4.1 Radical Change without Change 
The Post-Political and Depoliticization 
The post-political or post-democratic condition is a radical philosophical concept that offers a critical 
reading of contemporary climate change/environmental politics.  
The post-political signals the entry of technocratic management and politics of consensus where 
proper democratic politics and political struggles have been reduced down to social administration 
(Swyngedouw, 2011). It denotes “a political condition that has evacuated dispute and disagreement 
from the spaces of public encounter,” as Erik Swyngedouw put it (2010: 215), and replaced it with a 
widespread agreement over existing conditions and appropriate action (Swyngedouw, 2011). 
Swyngedouw (2010) identifies the post-political as socially homogenising as it frames environmental 
problems, notably climate change, as a disembodied enemy against which all of us must fight, 
regardless of our individual circumstances and interests.2 It thus silences different ideologies and 
viewpoints so that all can unite around the cause, and prevents alternative views on how to 
                                                          
2
 Another aspect of this is that environmental problems become unsolvable – unthinkable even – at the local 
and indiviual level. They are framed as global problems that require action at the more abstract, global level. 
For further discussion, see e.g. (Adger et al., 2001).  
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understand and tackle environmental problems from gaining ground. In this sense, the post-political 
society is a closed one and it “eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the 
consensus)”(Swyngedouw, 2010: 226). 
The Climate Change Consensus  
In the case of the ecological crisis, as several scholars have noted (J. Foster & Clark, 2012; Moolna, 
2012; Swyngedouw, 2010, 2013), the issue of climate change has been elevated to the top of the 
political agenda while other issues receive less recognition. In other words, a consensus has been 
reached on what climate change is and what the appropriate solution to it is. In their influential 
article on planetary boundaries, Rockström et al. (2009) state that the environmental problems of 
today cannot be tackled in isolation from one another as they are tightly coupled. This insight does 
not undermine the importance of tackling climate change but reminds us that curbing CO2 emissions 
is not a panacea to all our environmental and resource-related problems. 
Swyngedouw (2009, 2010, 2013) has argued that the climate change consensus is hegemonic and 
“radically reactionary” and that it “holds on to a harmonious view of Nature that can be recaptured 
while reproducing, if not solidifying, a liberal-capitalist order for which there seems to be no 
alternative” (2010: 228). In other words, Swyngedouw sees in the environmental discourse a 
disciplining power that strives to stabilise the status quo and its power is gained from de-politicising 
socio-environmental conflicts, i.e. conceal the struggles  
Carbon Fetishism 
According to Swyngedouw (2010: 219) CO2 has now become the “thing around which our 
environmental dreams, aspirations, contestations as well as policies crystallize.” In other words, CO2 
has been fetishized and this “has led to a conceptual focus on abstract carbon that excludes 
consideration of its wider context” (Moolna, 2012: 2). Carbon markets, trading regimes and treaties 
such as e.g. carbon offsetting and the Kyoto Protocol establish CO2 as a commodity, “a perfect 
neoliberal object” (Swyngedouw, 2009: 612)(see also Bumpus & Man, 2008). Carbon fetishism lies at 
the heart of capitalism’s response to climate change, reducing not only our concerns with climate 
change down to CO2 emissions, but also the terms ‘green’ and ‘sustainable’ down to a 
decontextualized ‘success’ in reducing emissions (Russell, 2012). Foster and Clark claim these efforts 
are nothing but “a renewed strategy for profiting from planetary destruction” (2009).   
Renewable energy has thus been put on the international agenda, not least in the EU (see e.g. 
Hammons, 2008; Ringel, 2006), as one of the main responses to climate change (IPCC, 2012). 
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However, Byrne and Toly (2006) claim that too little attention has been given to critically analysing 
the premises of the current energy regime. They contend that a renewable energy regime would 
have the same leitmotif as the unsustainable one it is meant to replace, i.e. ever increasing energy 
production to drive more economic growth (Sayer, 2009). Apart from neglecting the negative 
environmental impacts renewable energy might have, its social implications are not necessarily 
beneficial (see e.g. Islar, 2014).  
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4. Case Background 
4.1 Iceland: Basic facts  
Iceland is a volcanically active island, situated on the 
Mid-Atlantic Ridge in the North Atlantic Ocean 
(Pálmason, 2005). With an area of 103.000 km2 
(Statistics Iceland, n.d.-a) and only 326.000 
inhabitants (Statistics Iceland, n.d.-b) it is one of the 
world’s most sparsely populated countries, though 
the population is expected to grow to ca. 420 
thousand by 2050 (Statistics Iceland, 2014). 
Considered one of Europe’s poorest and least developed countries at the turn of the 20th century, 
Iceland’s economy grew rapidly at the end of the century and the country now enjoys very high living 
standards (Pálmason, 2005). Although the financial crisis of 2008 hit the Icelandic economy and 
society hard, living standards remain high. The biggest industrial sectors are the fishing industry, 
aluminium production and the tourism sector.3 Aluminium production began in 1969 and there are 
now three aluminium smelters in operation, producing 790 thousand tonnes of aluminium per year 
(Samtök iðnaðarins, 2009a). The tourism sector has expanded rapidly, or by 54% between 2009 and 
2012, and exceeded both the fishing industry and aluminium production in terms of foreign exchange 
for the first time in 2013 (Landsbankinn, 2013). 
4.2 The Energy Sector 
Apart from fisheries, Iceland’s main resources are hydropower and geothermal energy, which are 
harnessed for district heating (geothermal) and electricity (geothermal and hydro). Both energy 
sources have been utilised to some extend since the beginning of the 20th century. Harnessing of 
geothermal energy for district heating grew rapidly in the 1970s, partly in reaction to the 
international oil crises, so that nine out of ten Icelanders now have access to district heating powered 
by geothermal energy (Orkustofnun, n.d.-b). In 1970, geothermal energy was used for the first time 
for electricity generation (Landsvirkjun, n.d.-a) and the same year the river Þjórsá became Iceland’s 
first glacial river to be harnessed to support heavy industry. 
                                                          
3
 Iceland imports the bauxite and the ore needed for aluminium production.  
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Two of the main characteristics of the energy system in Iceland are the relatively low price of energy 
and the intensity of energy production and consumption in the country. Iceland is now by far the 
world’s largest electricity producer and also the world’s largest energy consumer per capita 
(Orkustofnun, n.d.-f). This is mainly due to consumption by heavy industry. 
85% of primary energy use in Iceland is from hydropower and geothermal energy, while 15% comes 
from imported oil and coal. Oil and coal consumption has been relatively stable in recent decades but 
use of hydropower and geothermal energy has multiplied (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. This graph gives an overview of the expansion of energy use in Iceland since 1970 and 
especially since the turn of the Millennium. The expansion is a result of electricity generation 
for the aluminium industry. Geothermal energy is the biggest energy source and has doubled in 
output in less than a decade. Hydropower also doubled from ca. 2005 to 2010. Oil and coal are 
mainly used for transport. PJ = Peta Joule. (Source: (Orkustofnun, n.d.-j)) 
 
43% of the geothermal energy are used for district heating. However, electricity production from 
geothermal energy has grown rapidly in the last two decades (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. 70.3% of the electricity in Iceland is produced from hydropower, or 1885 MW of 
installed capacity (12.337 GWh/yr). Production from geothermal energy has increased recently 
and now accounts for 29.7% of the total production or 659 MW installed capacity (5.210 
GWh/yr) while only a fraction, or 0.02%, come from fossil fuels. (Source: Adapted by author 
from (Orkustofnun, n.d.-h)). 
While electricity consumption by non-aluminium related activities has grown steadily or by a couple 
of per cent every year (Orkustofnun, n.d.-a), aluminium production has claimed the bulk of the 
increased capacity (Figure 3)(Figure 4). The three aluminium smelters in Iceland, owned by Icelandic 
subsidiaries of Rio Tinto Alcan, Alcoa and Century Aluminum, have a production capacity of 790 
thousand tonnes aluminium per year (Samtök iðnaðarins, 2009b).   
In spite of this rapid increase in energy production from hydropower and geothermal energy, Iceland 
has harnessed less than half of the country’s total exploitable (hydro) energy and tapped into 6 of 19 
high-temperature geothermal fields, and differs in this respect from many other European countries  
(Þórhallsdóttir, 2007b). However, there is currently little demand for increased production except 
from aluminium companies.  
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Figure 3. In 2012, the aluminium industry in Iceland required 71% of the total electricity use, 
having grown from 1.495 GWh in 1992 to 12.502 GWh in 2012. (Source: (Orkustofnun, n.d.-e)) 
 
Figure 4.  The share of different sectors in electricity consumption in Iceland in 2012. (Source: 
(Orkustofnun, n.d.-d)).  
Energy and utility companies in Iceland are mostly publicly-owned, i.e. by the state and the 
municipalities. In 1965, Landsvirkjun (the National Energy Company) was founded and assigned the 
role of building and operating energy infrastructure (including reservoirs, dams, heating utilities and 
the electricity transmission system). The Icelandic state owns a 100% share in Landsvirkjun and the 
company currently produces 70% of all electricity in Iceland (Orkustofnun, n.d.-g).4 Orkustofnun (the 
National Energy Authority) was founded in 1967. It is a government agency under the Ministry of 
                                                          
4
 Until 2003, when Alþingi (The Icelandic Parliament) adopted a new Energy Act based on an EU directive 
(92/96) on internal electricity markets, Landsvirkjun produced up to 85% of all electricity in Iceland. The new 
Energy Act opened up the electricity market to other energy companies, creating a free-market environment. 
Currently, four of Iceland’s six electricity producers are public companies.  
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Industry,5 responsible for licencing and monitoring energy exploitation, regulating the utility and 
distribution system and advising the Icelandic government on energy issues as well as conducting 
energy research (Orkustofnun, n.d.-c).  
 
 
Figure 5. A diagram showing the public administrative and political bodies most relevant for the 
energy system. (Source: Made by author). 
 
4.2.1 The Master Plan for Hydropower and Geothermal Energy  
The Master Plan for Hydropower and Geothermal Energy Resources (from now on Master Plan) was 
initiated in 1999 by the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of the Environment. Its objective was to 
“provide a comprehensive national-level policy basis for the sustainable use of potential hydropower 
and geothermal resources” (Þórhallsdóttir, 2007a, 2007b). It is carried out in three phases, 1999-
2003, 2003-2011 and the thirds phase is under way since 2013.  
The Ministry of Environment commissions special steering committees for each phase, which are 
supported by working groups of experts and professionals, e.g. natural scientists (Master Plan, n.d.). 
These specialised working groups evaluate ca. 100 power projects based on a) impacts of the project 
(economic, social and environmental factors, regional development and impacts on landscapes, 
cultural heritage, use and recreational value) and b) the protection value of the area in which the 
power project is placed (taking into account biodiversity, landscape, cultural monuments, geological 
                                                          
5
 Currently the Ministry of Industry and Innovation, where the Minister of Industry is responsible for 
Orkustofnun.  
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monuments etc.) (Figure 6). Finally, projects are categorised according to the outcome of the 
working groups along two axes (impacts vs. value) in either protection or utilisation. Some projects 
that fall in between get re-evaluated in a later phase.  
The Master Plan does not replace EIAs, which are project-based and have to be carried out for each 
project that falls under the utilisation category before energy harnessing can begin. Rather, it takes 
place on a higher level of policy and planning and is meant as a response to the shortcomings of EIAs, 
e.g. in accounting for cumulative effects of energy development (Þórhallsdóttir, 2007b).  
 
 
Figure 6. The categorisation of power projects under the Master Plan. High values on both the 
x-axis and the y-axis indicate low negative impacts (in this case for nature and cultural heritage 
(x-axis) and recreational value and other use (y-axis)) and low values indicate high negative 
impacts. Blue dots indicate hydropower projects and red dots indicate geothermal projects. 
The curved lines in each corner mark the protection category (bottom left) and the utilisation 
category (top right), and the arrows demonstrate how the valuation process progresses 
towards the middle, providing a balance between use and protection. (Source: (Master Plan, 
2011)).  
 
4.3 The Highlands  
Most of Iceland’s hydro-electricity production today, as well as most of the potential future sites for 
both geothermal and hydropower plants, is located in Iceland’s interior, the highlands (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. The central highlands cover almost half of Iceland’s area. Most of Iceland’s large 
hydropower projects are located in this area, as the area’s topography provides suitable 
conditions for building reservoirs and utilising vertical drop. (Source: (Þórhallsdóttir, 2002)) 
In general, the term highland denotes most of Iceland’s interior, or half of the country’s area (ca. 
50.000 km2). It is an uninhabitable highland plateau characterised by isolated mountains and large 
glaciers (Þórhallsdóttir, 2002), from which the country’s numerous glacial rivers originate (Ibid). The 
highlands are largely devoid of infrastructure except for gravel roads, mountain huts and energy 
infrastructure.6 The area is practically bereft of vegetation and most of it is classified as desert. The 
only undisturbed areas of vegetation (ca. 5% of total area) are concentrated around river catchments 
and headwaters and, consequently, are often found in places that are also suitable for energy 
development (Hálfdanarson & Karlsdóttir, 2005, 188-189). 
The highlands have long been a place of wonder and mystery for Icelanders, and an inspiration for 
folklore and stories about ghosts and outlaws (Þórhallsdóttir, 2002). From the 17th till the late 19th 
century, very little was actually known about the highlands as few ventured to travel there. In recent 
decades, partly due to the growing tourism sector, the interest in the highlands for recreation and 
outdoors activities has been revived (G. T. Jóhannesson & Huijbens, 2010; Sæþórsdóttir, 2010).  
4.4 Energy Projects in Iceland: Cases of Conflict 
In this section I introduce three illustrative cases of energy projects that have caused controversy in 
Iceland and become a nation-wide bone of contention. They are all located in or close to protected 
natural areas of rich biodiversity and unique landscapes and they have been sought after for 
                                                          
6
 The highlands are practically bereft of vegetation and most of the area is classified as desert. Research has 
shown (Arnalds et al., 2001) that the highlands once had a much more extensive vegetation cover but severe 
land degradation, initiated by obtrusive land use and grazing practices early after human settlement, has 
stripped the land of its soil cover 
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electricity production for heavy-industry. These cases will be discussed further in the analysis 
(chapter 5.2).  
4.5.1 Þjórsárver and Norðlingaalda Reservoir 
South of Hofsjökull glacier, at the headwaters of glacial river Þjórsá, lies an area called Þjórsárver, 600 
m above sea level (Figure 8). It is the most extensive, undisturbed vegetated area in the highlands 
with an unusually diverse flora and fauna, the biggest permafrost area in Iceland, and the world’s 
biggest breeding ground for the pink-footed goose (Anser brachyrhynchus)(E. Ólafsson et al., 2009). It 
was declared a nature reserve in 1981 and has been protected under the RAMSAR convention since 
1990 (Umhverfisstofnun, n.d.). Due to its ecological diversity, unrivalled elsewhere in the highlands, 
and as a remnant of an almost lost biotope, Þjórsárver is considered to be nationally and 
internationally valuable (E. Ólafsson et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 8. Location of river Þjórsá, Þjórsárver and Norðlingaalda, the site of the proposed 
reservoir. Source: Based on map from Landmælingar Íslands. Þjórsárver covers 960 km
2
, of 
which 146 km
2
 are vegetated. The nature reserve is 358 km
2 
but does not include all the 
vegetated area. (Adapted by author from: http://www.lmi.is/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/1_3M.pdf)  
As of today, Landsvirkjun operates six hydropower stations in Þjórsá7 below Þórisvatn reservoir, the 
largest lake in Iceland (88 km2), which was created to regulate the water flow to the power stations. 
In 1949, the company proposed to build a reservoir in the upper part of Þjórsá, 2 km south of the 
current boundaries of Þjórsárver nature reserve, by a place called Norðlingaalda. The project, i.e. 
                                                          
7
 More precisely, this also includes the river Tungnaá, which originates in Tungnafellsjökull glacier northwest of 
Vatnajökull. Tungnaá used to flow eastwards to join Þjórsá, but is now diverted through Kvíslaveita dams into 
Þórisvatn reservoir, resulting in a 40% loss of water volume in Þjórsá.  
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different versions of the dam, has been in the pipelines since but has not come into operation, not 
least due to nature protection concerns (G. P. Ólafsson, 2007).  
Although it is not contended anymore that Þjórsárver should be protected, disagreements remain as 
to the boundaries of the reserve, and Landsvirkjun still intends to build a smaller version of the 
originally proposed dam by Norðlingaalda8 and transport the water through underground tunnels 
towards Þórisvatn. The resulting increase in production is meant to power an aluminium smelter in 
Helguvík, Reykjanes Peninsula (Norðurál, 2013).  
4.5.2 Kárahnjúkar Hydropower Project 
In 2003, Landsvirkjun embarked upon Iceland’s biggest energy project to date, the Kárahnjúkar 
hydropower project in the eastern part of the highlands (Figure 9). The project is commonly referred 
to as Kárahnjúkavirkjun (Kárahnjúkar hydropower project) as the biggest dam of the three, 198 
metres tall and 700 metres wide, is located by mountain Fremri-Kárahnjúkur(Landsvirkjun, n.d.-b). It 
produces electricity for an aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður, which is the biggest one in Iceland 
and produces 360 thousand tonnes of aluminium annually (Alcoa, 2014).  
 
Figure 9. An overview of the area of Kárahnjúkar hydropower project. The project consists of three 
dams in the river Jökulsá á Dal, two small reservoirs and dams in river Jökulsá í Fljótsdal, Hálslón 
reservoir and a power station in Fljótsdalur (Fljótsdalsstöð), where electricity is generated and 
transported to Alcoa Fjarðaáls’(subsidiary of Alcoa) aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður, one of the 
fjords in the east. The power station and the aluminium smelter came into operation in 2007. The 
power station has an installed capacity of 690 MW and generation capacity of 4800 GWh/yr. (Map: 
http://www.geotimes.org/aug02/WebExtra0801map.html) 
 
                                                          
8
 at 566-567.5 m a.s.l., 
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One of the areas that went partly under Hálslón reservoir was Kringilsárrani at the edge of outlet 
glacier Brúarjökull. Kringilsárrani had been a protected area since 1975 due to its robust vegetation 
cover and its value as a grazing area for Iceland’s reindeer population, but the protection was 
revoked in 2003 by the Minister of Environment at the time in order to enable the construction of 
Hálslón reservoir (G. P. Ólafsson, 2007; Vatnajökulsþjóðgarður, n.d.). Iceland’s deepest river canyon, 
Hafrahvammagljúfur, was mostly submerged by Hálslón, and with it established breeding grounds for 
the pink-footed goose were lost. It has been estimated that at least 100 waterfalls in the two glacial 
rivers disappeared as a result of the project, as well as unique geological formations, landscapes and 
undisturbed wilderness, and these impacts are irreversible (Einarsson, 2001). 
In 2000, the National Planning Agency (NPA) issued an environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the 
project and rejected it on the basis of severe negative, irreversible environmental impacts (NPA, 
2000). However, Landsvirkjun appealed to the Ministry of Environment, and the Minister decided to 
override NPA’s decision, claiming that national economic and societal benefits of the project 
superseded environmental concerns (J. P. Jóhannsson, 2013). 
4.5.3 Hellisheiði Geothermal Plant 
The geothermal power plant Hellisheiði is located in a geothermal field in central volcano Hengill, ca. 
20-30 km away from Reykjavík. It is owned and operated by Reykjavík Energy (Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, 
OR), a public utility company that is co-owned by three municipalities. It is a combined heat and 
power plant, with installed capacity of 303 MW of electricity (MWe) and 133 MW thermal energy 
(MWth) for district heating (OR, n.d.). 
 
Figure 10. A map of the southwest corner of Iceland and Reykjanes peninsula. (NB The city of 
Reykjavík is actually missing from the map, but it is located between Seltjarnarnes and 
Kópavogur).  
(Adapted by author from: http://www.lmi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1_3M.pdf)  
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The power plant was built between 2006 and 2011 in anticipation of a new aluminium smelter in 
Helguvík, Reykjanes Peninsula (Norðurál, 2013), which would be owned by Norðurál Grundartangi 
Ltd., a subsidiary of Century Aluminium (see Norðurál, n.d.) and largely powered by Hellisheiði plant 
(Viðskiptablaðið, 2012).9 The company claimed that the smelter in Helguvík would be one of the 
world’s most environmentally friendly smelters (“Century Aluminum’s Norðurál Plant, Helguvík, 
Iceland,” n.d.) However, soon after the final construction stage of Hellisheiði power plant, it became 
clear that it would not support full production capacity for long (OR, 2013a). Production had dropped 
to 276 MWe in 201310 and is expected to drop by a few per cent every year, placing OR in a difficult 
financial situation and putting plans for an aluminium smelter in Helguvík on permanent hold.  
  
                                                          
9
 The smelter was meant to require 450 MW electricity and have a production capacity of 360 thousand tonnes 
aluminium.  
10
 Output of goethermal water has not declined but is less then originally expected.  
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5. Analysis 
Based on Hajer’s ADA, I have studied the energy discourse in Iceland and identified a particular story-
line as the hegemonic discourse. I will refer to it as the green-energy narrative. This story-line draws 
on discourses on the environment and sustainability, but it has also internalised an older story-line 
which is built on the framing of HGE as one of the main pillars of Iceland’s prosperity. The green-
energy narrative, particularly in recent years, has consolidated and been exposed through discursive 
struggles with alternative story-lines, e.g. with the environmental movement. 
After analysing the green-energy narrative below (chapter 5.1), I discuss three cases that illustrate 
the hegemonic status of the green-energy narrative and demonstrate how it has influenced the 
material expansion of the energy sector in Iceland (chapter 5.2). Thereafter, I present the main 
criticism offered against the green-energy narrative without attempting to frame that criticism as a 
coherent story-line (chapter 5.3), as I believe there are many alternative story-lines at play in the 
discourse on energy in Iceland (see e.g. I. Á. Jóhannesson, 2005 for a discussion of three discourses). 
The green-energy narrative can be summarised as follows (see Table 2. below for a summary of the 
main assumptions and opposing claims): 
 The story-line: Iceland’s economic prosperity depends on the harnessing of nature’s 
resources, particularly HGE. Further energy production and development of heavy-industry is 
inevitable if we want to keep living standards high. HGE sources are renewable and green 
and are used sustainably in Iceland. In the face of climate change, it is Iceland’s responsibility 
to the world to produce more green energy and contribute to lowering the world’s ecological 
footprint that way. This does not jeopardise Icelandic nature because energy development 
and nature protection can go together. 
 
 The discourse-coalition: Key actors: Orkustofnun, Landsvirkjun and other energy companies, 
public institutions, the government, political parties and politicians. Other actors: The 
Icelandic aluminium companies11, the Association of Aluminum Producers in Iceland (SAMÁL) 
and engineering firms, (sometimes) municipalities where energy development takes place.12 
Additionally, the media, the public and the tourism sector play indirect roles through 
reproducing the story-line. The practices within which the discourse-coalition reproduces the 
story-line are e.g. politics, official policies, political debates, public debates, a particular use 
of language and concepts, PR efforts (by companies) etc.  
According to Hajers’ ADA, discourse-coalitions form around story-lines and not interests. Therefore, I 
do not claim that all parties to the discourse-coalition necessarily profit from maintaining the story-
line. Evidently, that is an important issue to study but it is largely beyond the scope of this thesis.  
                                                          
11
 Subsidiaries of Alcoa, Rio Tinto Alcan and Century Aluminum.  
12
 The media and the tourism industry sometimes play a supporting role, but I will not focus particularly on 
their role.  
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Table 2. An overview of the main underlying assumptions of the green-energy narrative contrasted with alternative perspectives.  
 
 
Green-energy Narrative Criticism/perspectives from alternative story-lines 
Economic assumptions Resource utilisation as foundation for prosperity. Resource utilisation as foundation for prosperity, but no 
need for more/other pillars also important.  
-------//---------- Economic growth necessary. Growth overrides other 
interests of society. 
Economic growth only a part of a healthy society.  
Decision-making Economic tools and expert-knowledge as foundation for 
decision-making. Management rather than politics  
Economic tools not sufficient when it comes to the 
energy sector.   
Relationship with nature Utilitarian view of nature. Man as steward of nature. 
Anthropocentric. 
Humans as stewards or a part of nature. 
Mostly anthropocentric but eco-centric views exist.  
Views on nature (Icelandic) nature as first and foremost a resource and 
economic foundation. Iceland as unique.  
(Icelandic) nature as mainly a cultural heritage, and 
source of freedom and identity. Iceland as unique. 
Views on resources Nationalistic. Resources belong to Icelanders. Emphasis 
on the right to use the resources.   
Nationalistic. Resources belong to Icelanders, but 
emphasis on the right of future generations to enjoy 
wilderness and nature.  
Rationality Instrumental rationality dominant. Little tolerance for 
‘ideologies’ or ‘emotions’. Nature valued for its use-value. 
Open to other ways of knowing and seeing. Ideology 
valued. 
Nature valued for its abstract/aesthetic value and 
intrinsic value. 
Energy The energy in Iceland is green, renewable and used in a 
sustainable way. Positive towards heavy-industry and a 
substantial increase in energy generation.  
Critical of the claims that energy in Iceland in green, 
renewable and used sustainably. Energy cannot be 
green if the highlands are sacrificed for it. Negative 
towards selling more energy to heavy-industry.  
Energy and nature Energy can be (and is) reconciled with nature protection 
and tourism/other use.  
Energy development and nature protection do not go 
together, nor with tourism/other use.  
International perspectives Producing energy from RE seen as a contribution to 
fighting climate change.  
Preserving nature as wilderness seen as a contribution 
to the world.  
Sustainability Economic pillar as foundation for overall sustainability. Nature cannot be substituted with capital.  
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5.1 The Green-Energy Narrative 
“The prosperity and independence of the Icelandic nation began when nature’s forces 
were harnessed for the sake of the economy.” (Elíasson & Pétursson, 2003) 
5.1.1 Historical Roots: ‘Tinder Light in the Dark Desert’ 
The origins of the green-energy narrative can be traced back to the early 20th century when 
industrialisation began in Iceland. It coincided not only with Iceland’s progression towards 
independence13 but also with the harnessing of HGE for district heating and electricity (see chapter 
4.2). This development was driven by politicians, entrepreneurs and poets such as Einar 
Benediktsson (Karlsdóttir, 2010: 23-26): 
How we might improve the lot of our country and nation 
By placing a mighty arrow on your bow-string  
Using rightly the energy in the plunging water […+ 
Thus, we might furrow life from the sheet of death 
And tinder light in the dark desert 
By the pulsating energy in your electric veins. 
     Einar Benediktsson - Dettifoss
14
 
This verse summarises neatly the mentality of those years, and the faith that was placed on 
hydropower in getting the country out of poverty. Harnessing the ‘dead’ energy in the rivers would 
‘tinder light in the dark desert’ and bring prosperity (Karlsdóttir, 2010: 32). Around the same time 
people’s attitudes towards the glacial rivers changed. They became potential sources of wealth and a 
key to future prosperity (Hálfdanarson, 2005), while unharnessed they “served no one” and were a 
mere nuisance, impeding travel and communication (Karlsdóttir, 2010: 32). The power balance 
between man and nature shifted in the minds of Icelanders (Ibid: 35) and this marked the beginning 
of the commodification of rivers – and waterfalls particularly – as they became popular investments. 
Views on nature and resources subsequently became strictly utilitarian (Árnason, 2005) and 
nationalistic (Hálfdanarson, interview). The coupling of independence and prosperity with resource 
use would grow and solidify in coming decades (Árnason, 2005: 17-18). 
Around the middle of the century a comprehensive energy strategy began taking shape in Iceland, 
resulting in the founding of Landsvirkjun (1965) and Orkustofnun (1967) (see chapter 4.2). In 1969, 
Orkustofnun claimed there were at least 35.000 GWh (35 TWh) of harnessable hydropower in the 
country15 and put forward plans to dam all the biggest glacial rivers to generate electricity for heavy 
                                                          
13
 Iceland became a sovereign state in 1918 and gained full independence from Denmark in 1944.  
14
 This verse is taken from Benediktsson poem Dettifoss. The title is the name of Iceland‘s most powerful 
waterfall in glacial river Jökulsá á Fjöllum. Translation from (Hálfdanarson, 2005: 189). 
15
 For comparison, Iceland generated roughly 17 TWh altogether from HGE in 2013.  
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industry, i.e. aluminium smelters. These plans were made with some urgency, as it was generally 
thought that nuclear energy would render hydropower unprofitable within the next decades 
(Hálfdanarson, 2005). The most staggering idea involved channelling all the glacial rivers in the 
Northeast16 to a big reservoir northeast of Vatnajökull glacier – a project that was called Austurland 
Power Project and later was realised to some extend in Kárahnjúkar Power Project in 2003-2007.  
Subsequently, concerns were raised by nature protectionists that clashes might occur between the 
energy sector and nature protection (Karlsdóttir, 2010). To that, Orkustofnun’s senior engineer (and 
later director) Jakob Björnsson had a clear answer: 
“A sensible discourse on nature protection in this country in the future is bound to take into 
account one central assertion and be based on it. That is, that the nation intents to live in this 
country and enjoy similar standards of living in the future as those who are most prosperous in 
the world. *…+ To live in this country will, in the future, signify the full utilisation of its natural 
resources *…+. It is very important that this conclusion is at the heart of all discourse on nature 
protection in the future.  
And, furthermore: 
The main concern of the nature protectionist is not if but how. Not if Gullfoss
17
 should be 
harnessed, but how.”  
Interestingly, Björnsson did not simply dismiss the views of those who claimed nature should be 
protected. Rather, he subordinated nature protection to energy generation and reduced its purpose 
to a supporting role, and by doing that he influenced the way nature protection was – and is – 
perceived in Iceland: As a sub-category to industrial expansion.  
For the later half of the 20th century, these attitudes governed the discourse on energy in Iceland and 
shaped policies on energy and the environment.  
5.1.2 Energy in times of Sustainable Development – ‘The Whole World is at Stake’  
Lowest Energy Prices!! and the Government’s White Book on Energy 
When the concept of sustainable development entered the political scene in Iceland in the 1990s, it 
brought with it a new incentive to expand the energy sector. The Brundtland-report (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987) had called for the development of low-energy 
pathways based on renewable energy and categorised both hydro-power and geothermal energy as 
renewable energy sources. This invited the argument that it was Iceland’s duty to the world to 
                                                          
16
 Jökulsá á Dal, Jökulsá á Fljótsdal and Jökulsá á Fjöllum , where Dettifoss is. The word jökuls-á literally means 
glacial-river.  
17
 Gullfoss waterfall (E. The Golden Waterfall) in river Hvítá is Iceland‘s most famous waterfall. 
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increase its energy production from the country’s renewable sources to lower global GHG emissions. 
Thus, a dimension was added to the story-line: Now it was not just the prerogative of the Icelandic 
people to harness the resources for progress and prosperity but it suddenly became a contribution to 
the fight against climate change (see e.g. Hálfdanarson & Karlsdóttir, 2005; I. Á. Jóhannesson, 2005).  
Icelandic authorities created a favourable climate for investment in heavy industry in the next years 
by adopting flexible tax policies and by introducing energy prices that the government claimed to be 
“lower than anywhere else in Europe and North America” (MIL, 1995). Furthermore, energy 
authorities embarked on an assessment of Iceland’s potential production capacity (The Ministry of 
Industry, 1994), later referred to as the White Book on energy, and began marketing the country as 
attractive for foreign heavy-industry companies. 
For these purposes, the Icelandic Energy Marketing Unit (MIL),18 published a brochure in 1995 titled 
Lowest Energy Prices!! In it, it is stated that utilising Iceland’s energy sources to drive economic 
growth is “high on the Government’s priority list”.19 Under the heading Power in Plenty without 
Pollution, MIL claims that: 
“Iceland has clean hydro and geothermal energy resources which are still largely unutilized. 
These energy resources are abundant in relation to present and projected future domestic 
demand in Iceland. Economically harnessable hydropower from a number of small and 
medium-size power plants with relatively little environmental impact is estimated at 30,000 
GWh/yr while comparable geothermal resources are estimated to be about 20,000 GWh/yr. 
The total potential for electricity production from both sources is thus estimated to be about 
50,000 GW/yr at a sufficiently low cost to be of interest to power-intensive industries *…+.”
20
 
(Italics mine) 
Furthermore, it is stated that “*h+ydropower and geothermal energy are clean, non-polluting, self-
sustainable sources of energy” and that energy-intensive industries using this energy “contribute 
towards protecting the global atmosphere”,21 although this is not explained further. With regards to 
environmental impacts and EIA, the brochure promises “minimum environmental red-tape” and 
claims that good solutions have been found in Iceland for “handling the environmental impacts of 
the new power-intensive industries.” The brochure was published a year after EIAs were legalised for 
                                                          
18
 MIL is an independent agency of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, was founded in 1988 with the main aim 
of promoting and marketing Iceland’s energy resources. It seeks investors in the power-intensive industries and 
fosters the direct export of power (Mackay & Probert, 1996: 248). 
19
 The same parties formed the government at the time as today, Sjálfstæðisflokkur and Framsóknarflokkur.  
20 Considering the fact that Iceland now generates ca. 17,000 GWh/yr after a substantial expansion in the last 
few years, 50,000 GW/yr seems like a bold estimate.  
21
 The brochure also advertises Iceland as “nature at its purest”, with the “freshest air you will ever breathe and 
the purest water in the world”.  
30 
 
the first time and there was no experience of that process at the time, so it is unclear what these 
solutions represent or how the authorities interpreted “relatively little environmental impact”.  
The White Book on Energy bears clear testimony to the authorities’ will to attract heavy-industry. In 
the document, basically all glacial rivers and geothermal fields in Iceland are presented as 
harnessable with very little or no environmental impact. However, it is also stated that the White 
Book is intended to establish the reconciliation of energy production and nature protection. In view 
of the authorities’ actions the years following the publication of the White Book, e.g. in the case of 
Kárahnjúkar power project (see chapter 5.2.2), it is difficult to interpret this as anything but the 
subjection of nature protection to energy production (The Ministry of Industry, 1994).  
Iceland and the Kyoto Protocol 
Historian Hálfdanarson has noted that “the modern environmental discourse has been used more 
effectively in promoting the energy intensive industries in Iceland rather than opposing them” 
(Hálfdanarson, 2005: 199). The examples above support his claim, and so does Iceland’s approach to 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
The delegation to the UNFCCC convention in Kyoto 1997 successfully argued that Iceland should be 
exempt from emission commitments due to its unique position in terms of renewable energy 
sources22. Iceland was then granted further exemptions based on a special decision adopted into the 
Protocol in Marrakech in 2001 at the bequest of the Icelandic delegation (referred to as Decision 
14/CP7)(I. Á. Jóhannesson, 2005).23  
A recent report issued by the Environmental Agency of Iceland showed that in 2012, net GHG 
emissions were 26% higher in Iceland than in 1990. Emissions from heavy-industry have increased by 
116% since 199024. Iceland’s ‘green’ energy sector has thus enabled the country to radically increase 
its GHG emissions (“Viðmiðum Kyoto náð en vistsporið risastórt,” 2014). Thus, the recognition of 
UNFCCC has been used to drastically expand Iceland’s energy sector and it is applied as an argument 
in the debate on what to do with Iceland’s resources (Karlsdóttir, 2010; see Landsvirkjun, 2007, 
2011).  
This shows how the current international efforts to fight climate change lay the foundation for 
prioritising CO2 emissions over other environmental concerns. 
                                                          
22
 Iceland was allowed to raise emissions by 10% until 2012.  
23
 Without this exemption in 2001, the Kárahnjúkar Power Project would have caused Iceland to exceed its 
emission limits. 
24
 Net GHG emissions of Iceland were 3500 tonnes in 1990 and 4500 tonnes in 2012 of which industrial 
processes accounted for 1883 tonnes.  
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5.1.3 The Story-line Established: ‘Clean, non-polluting, self-sustainable’ 
The green-energy narrative is now firmly established in politics and policies on energy in Iceland.  
When asked to comment on the publication of IPCC’s fifth assessment report in March 2014, the 
Icelandic prime minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson said that Iceland’s energy sector was 
probably the most environmentally friendly in the world, and that it would now be Iceland’s duty to 
the world to harness more of the renewable energy sources it had in store (RÚV, 2014a). The director 
of Orkustofnun and the Minister of Industry, when I interviewed them in relation to this thesis, both 
expressed similar views:  
“Yes, yes, that’s what we are doing *reducing the world’s ecological footprint by producing 
aluminium from renewable energy in Iceland], because the aluminium smelters that are not 
built here are built in Qatar and Algeria instead and are fuelled by gas and have an ecological 
footprint 8-10 times higher than here. So it would require a lot of imagination to maintain 
otherwise.” (Jóhannesson, interview) 
 
“We have to realise that the whole world is at stake. *…+ If we are thinking of our social 
responsibility to the world, and we don’t use the energy we have, we have to understand that 
the industry will be built elsewhere and then driven by coal and oil which is worse for all of us.” 
(Árnadóttir, interview) 
This demonstrates how the proponents of the energy sector have adopted the moral obligations of 
the climate change discourse and aligned it with a vision of an expanding energy sector.  
Bjarni Benediktsson, then party leader of the Independence Party and now also Minister of Finance, 
claimed in 2012 that “Iceland cannot afford a regressive energy policy,” implicitly but clearly 
indicating the perceived necessity of expanding the energy sector (DV, 2012). A regressive energy 
policy would entail, he said, refraining from using the country’s energy resources, which would be 
unwise and irrational – which are terms often associated with those who oppose further energy 
development. In an interview with me, the current director of Orkustofnun expressed similar views 
as Benediktsson and Björnsson, Jóhannesson’s predecessor.  
“It’s not necessary *to build more power plants in order to keep living standards in Iceland 
high]. We could live without all this. On the other hand, we do aspire to keep living standards at 
a certain level, and we are still quite a long way off, we have not reached the same level as our 
neighbouring countries. And we don’t do that by sitting on our asses. We have to make use of 
what we have. *…+ Our development efforts cannot be funded on misanthropy, we assume 
Icelanders mean to live here, to provide for themselves, to develop, and the population will 
grow. So we will conquer more unspoilt areas. *…+ We can never say ‘nature is here and here 
we draw boundaries and here nothing will be done.’ Because this is not the way society 
functions and it never will be.” (Jóhannesson, interview).  
Ceasing to develop more areas for energy production – i.e. “sitting on our asses” – would equal 
bringing the country “back to 1940” in terms of living standards “and we are certainly not interested 
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in going there again.” Expanding the energy sector and building more aluminium smelters is the only 
remaining choice in this matter. However, it is clear that the pressure to expand in the last few 
decades has come from foreign aluminium companies such as Alcoa and Century Aluminum but not 
domestic users of electricity or hot water (Alcoa, 2008; RÚV, 2013d)(also Hálfdanarson, interview; 
Guðbrandsson, interview). Thus, the expansion is not about improvement of living standards through 
the provisioning of electricity and district heating to households, but can be seen as an example of 
the development that started in the 1970s, namely the production of energy to serve heavy industry. 
5.1.4 Language and discourse production 
Icelandic energy companies utilise the green label of Iceland’s energy as a marketing tool.  In a 2009 
publication titled Meet Iceland – a Pioneer in the Use of Renewable Resources, Iceland's energy 
system is described as clean, renewable and environmentally sound, and Iceland as “one of the 
world's greatest potential sources of renewable energy” (Orkustofnun, 2009). All of these terms are 
used consistently in Orkustofnun's publications, such as annual reports (Orkustofnun, 2012, 2013) 
and on its homepage where HGE is described as green and sustainable (Orkustofnun, n.d.-i). 
Landsvirkjun markets the use of HGE as renewable and sustainable (Landsvirkjun, n.d.-c, 2007, 2012) 
and itself as a leader in renewable energy (Landsvirkjun, 2011). 
Icelandic authorities continue to be the key actors in maintaining the story-line. In the current 
government's manifesto it is stated that “Iceland holds a unique position with regards to 
environmental affairs on the basis of its unspoilt nature and sustainable use of renewable resources” 
(No author, 2013). Not surprisingly, the government has talked very positively of expanding the 
energy sector (see e.g. Árnadóttir, 2013; Gunnlaugsson, 2013). Mr. Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, the 
President of Iceland, has been a strong proponent of this view, both in Iceland and abroad, stating on 
various occasions that “100% of our electricity production and 100% of house heating is provided by 
domestic, renewable resources: hydro and geothermal,” describing the development of the HGE 
sector as a “clean energy transformation” (Grímsson, 2013).  
Unavoidably, public perception of the energy system is influenced by the political discourse, as 
acknowledged by many of my interviewees:  
“I think the predominant attitude is that it's all just great and perfect. Environmentally friendly, 
sustainable, renewable and all that. *…+ If you ask all Icelanders I think the greatest majority of 
them would go along with that.” (Gíslason, interview) 
The results of the questionnaire I carried out support this claim (see Appendix I for more detail): 
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Questionnaire Question Agree or Strongly 
Agree 
3. Hydro and geothermal energy are renewable and environmentally 
sound sources of energy 
70% (24 out of 34) 
8. Energy production in Iceland is sustainable 56% (19 out of 34) 
 
5.1.5 The Green-energy Narrative as EM 
The discourse on energy in Iceland has become increasingly economistic and industry-friendly, 
namely in its framing of aluminium as a green metal and with policies that are tailored to the 
interests of international industrial companies (see chapter 5.1.2). It is based on an assumption that 
nature and energy production can be reconciled and that economic growth can be adjusted to avoid 
environmental destruction. This is a view shared by many of the most influential people in the energy 
sector today (Jóhannesson, interview; Árnadóttir, interview; Einarsson, interview; Ólafsdóttir, 
interview; Barðadóttir, interview). 
The change in the discourse on energy and environment in Iceland since the 1990s and Iceland’s 
adoption of flexible policies on energy production are clear signs of the process of EM. These policies 
are premised on the notion that the problems brought about by energy production can be fixed by 
different kinds of energy production or improved technology and that the rationale of the capitalistic 
market system and modern institutions does not have to stand in opposition to the environment.  
Icelandic energy authorities’ focus is first and foremost on continued economic growth. This reflects 
capital’s cultural hegemony in Icelandic energy politics and vividly demonstrates the influence of EM 
on the Icelandic energy sector.  
5.2 The Green-energy Narrative in Practice 
In this section, I discuss the cases presented in chapter 4.4 as illustrative examples of the material 
impacts of the green-energy narrative in Iceland. I attempt to demonstrate the hegemonic status of 
this discourse through the analytical lens of ADA and the theoretical perspectives presented above 
(Chapter 3.4).  
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5.2.1 Þjórsárver and Norðlingaalda Reservoir 
“In political reality, to argue against routinized understandings is to argue against the 
institutions that function on the basis of specific, structured, cognitive commitments.” (Hajer, 
1995: 57) 
 
“*O+ne should analyse in which practices discursive dominance is based and by what means 
specific contentions are furthered.” (Hajer, 1995: 60) 
On June 21, 2013, the Minister of Environment, Sigurður Ingi Jóhannsson, was scheduled to sign a 
proposal to expand the boundaries of the nature reserve in Þjórsárver considerably. The proposal 
was in accordance with the outcome of the second phase of the Master Plan, which had rejected the 
construction of Norðlingaalda reservoir due to its potential negative environmental impacts. The new 
proposal would eliminate Landsvirkjun’s hopes of building the reservoir25 and mark the end of the 
debate over Þjórsárver, which had lasted more than four decades (RÚV, 2013c).  
On the morning of June 21, it was announced that the Minister would not sign due to Landsvirkjun’s 
requests that the matter of Norðlingaalda reservoir be reopened (RÚV, 2014d). In January 2014, the 
Minister proposed new boundaries (Figure 11) and Norðlingaalda reservoir was back in game (RÚV, 
2014c).26  
 
Figure 11. Þjórsárver Nature Reserve. The green line indicates the current boundaries of the 
nature reserve and the red one shows the new boundaries as proposed by the previous 
Minister of Environment, in accordance with the outcome of the Master Plan. The detail shows 
the changes made to the proposal by the current Minister of Environment, after Landsvirkjun 
requested to build a smaller version of Norðlingaalda reservoir, which would be located by the 
tributary Svartá. Source: (Guðbjörnsson, 2013).  
                                                          
25
 Norðlingaalda reservoir, 566-567,5 m above sea level.  
26
 This decision did not amount to licencing the construction of the reservoir, but enabled Landsvirkjun to put 
forward a new version of it to be processed in the next phase of the Master Plan.  
35 
 
The Ministry justified its decision by stating that the boundaries of the area suggested for protection 
according to the Master Plan were geographically unclear and that the new proposed changes were 
“minor” (Umhverfisstofnun, 2013) and would not affect the Þjórsárver area as a whole.27 Minister 
Jóhannsson further said that he would, when it came to it, heed the expert verdict of the EIA that 
would have to be carried out before Landsvirkjun could build a smaller version of Norðlingaalda 
reservoir, and added that he felt it was very important that politicians did not make “political 
decisions by intervening in such things” (RÚV, 2014e).  
Over the next days and weeks (January 2014) the Ministry was harshly criticised (Einarsdóttir, 2014; 
RÚV, 2013c, 2014b) for ignoring the scientific case for including Norðlingaalda in the nature reserve, 
manipulating the decision-making process and enabling the development of energy infrastructure in 
a previously unspoilt area. The harshest criticism of all came from the experts of Working Group II of 
the Master Plan, the natural scientists who had rejected the Norðlingaalda reservoir. In an open 
letter to the Minister, they asserted that the boundaries as proposed by the Master Plan had been 
very clear (Guðjónsson, 2014). They further claimed that Jóhannsson was wrong in stating that the 
changes to the proposal were “minor”: 
“Speaking in such terms does not indicate a deep understanding of the conservation value of 
the area. What is being cut out *in the Minister’s proposal] is certainly a low percentage of the 
whole surface area of the nature reserve. However, the heart of the matter is that this change 
would involve considerable intervention into the landscape and wilderness in Þjórsárver. Thus, 
the boundaries of the nature reserve are tailored to the needs of the power project, and do not 
take nature’s value into account“ (Guðjónsson, 2014). 
In an interview on public TV, Jóhannsson criticised the scientific experts for “considering themselves 
to be politicans” who “can write articles and fight for their opinions”, indicating that they no longer 
deserved to be called “experts” if they participated in the public debate on Þjórsárver (Thorsson, 
2014). He thus attempted to exclude critical voices from the political sphere. The scientists, on the 
other hand, claimed that they were only pointing out the flaws in the Ministry’s interpretation of the 
Master Plan. Having previously declared his willingness to abide by the rule of experts, Jóhannsson’s 
critique raises questions whether some experts are more acceptable than others, or perhaps 
whether politicians are only willing to follow experts’ advice when it happens to coincide with their 
own political opinions or the interests of the energy sector.  
                                                          
27
 The Minister admitted that three waterfalls below the reservoir, considered to “have very high nature 
protection value”(Master Plan, 2011), would be severely affected were the reservoir to be built, but pointed 
out that the waterfalls had not been included in the previous proposal either. While technically correct, these 
waterfalls were one of the reasons why Norðlingaalda reservoir had been rejected in the Master Plan (Ibid.).   
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Clearly, the assumptions underlying the green-energy narrative get translated into concrete policies 
and institutionalised responses in Icelandic energy politics, which is an indicator of discursive 
hegemony (Hajer, 1995). Thus, the scientists who criticised the Minister were up against 
administrative structures that are premised on the view that Iceland’s resources are to be utilised to 
the full. The fact that the Ministry of the Environment interprets technical detail in the Master Plan in 
favour of the energy sector is only one example of the deep-rooted commitment to this view. 
Furthermore, the framing of the new proposal as a “minor” change is an attempt to suppress 
conflicts regarding this decision. This reveals the intolerance a depoliticized discourse has for 
alternative views.  
The future of Þjórsárver and Norðlingaalda is still undecided. However, this course of events exposed 
the discursive hegemony of the green-energy narrative. 
5.2.2 Kárahnjúkar Hydropower Project 
“*E+nvironmental politics becomes an argumentative struggle in which actors not only try to 
make others see the problems according to their views but also seek to position other actors in 
a specific way. Hence it is not as if actors do not have an intuitive idea about discourse theory, 
in actual fact they constantly practice it.” (Hajer, 1995: 53) 
 
“What the Icelandic nation doesn’t have is knowledge about the land. We have all these 
emotion *…+ but no natural scientific knowledge.” (Ólafsdóttir, interview).  
In the late 1990s, when it became clear that Kárahnjúkar hydropower project would become reality, 
public resistance against dedicating vast areas in the highlands to energy generation was growing 
(Karlsdóttir, 2010).  
Landsvirkjun and the government reacted to this by reminding Icelanders that utilising the country’s 
resources could not be avoided and that power lines should be seen as “signs of progress”, and not 
as nuisances (Ibid.: 164). Economic benefits were underlined – although several prominent 
economists challenged claims of the alleged economic profit due to high construction costs and low 
energy prices (Matthíasson, 2005; Siglaugsson, 1999) – and other issues, such as damage to 
ecosystems and the disappearance of more than a hundred waterfalls, were framed as necessary 
trade-offs (Karlsdóttir, 2010; Magnason, 2007).  
The Minister of Environment at the time, Siv Friðleifsdóttir, was in favour of the project due to its 
alleged economic benefits to the whole nation (Karlsdóttir, 2010: 166). When an EIA carried out by 
the NPA rejected the project due to its negative, irreversible environmental impacts (NPA, 2000), 
Friðleifsdóttir decided to override the verdict and grant the approval of the Ministry of Environment 
to build the reservoir.  
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This sparked a public outcry and demonstrations in Reykjavík. In addition to concerns about nature 
and the ecosystems in the area, natural beauty, wilderness and the value of the highlands as the 
nation’s cultural heritage were raised as reasons for rejecting the project. Landsvirkjun and the 
government’s response to this was to frame such views as sentimental and irrational and 
subsequently avoid confronting them (Ó. P. Jónsson, 2007). A poster published by Landsvirkjun 
captures this view clearly:  
Valid arguments, calculations and facts show that harnessing energy from the rivers is in the 
nation’s best interests. 
 
Emotions also matter… 
… but it is important to employ them adequately, appropriately, on the right issue, for the right 
reasons and at the right time. 
 
Do you think that decisions regarding the harnessing of rivers should be taken on the basis of 
feelings rather than arguments? 
 
Source: (Pálsdóttir, 2005: 106) 
This perspective permeated Icelandic society during those years and the environmental movement 
as a whole, as well as others who raised criticism, became associated with irrational sentimentality 
(Pálsdóttir, 2005). They were accused of taking a stance against progress and prosperity (Magnason, 
2007) and of hypocrisy, because they claimed to care for the environment but opposed harnessing 
the green energy that Iceland had to offer (Karlsdóttir, 2010). This shows how the environmental 
discourse has been used to promote heavy-industry in Iceland. 
Now, seven years after the project was completed and the aluminium smelter in Reyðarfjörður came 
into operation, the environmental impacts of the project are evident but the economic benefits not. 
The socio-economic benefits for the society in the East were much lower than expected (H. 
Jóhannesson, 2010) and there are strong indications that the project did not make sense 
economically (see chapter 5.3.3).  
The ecosystem in Lake Lagarfljót, into which the glacial river Jökulsá á Dal28 is now diverted, has 
collapsed according to a recent report (VMST, 2013). With the sediments from the glacial rivers, the 
lake is now too murky for light to penetrate. Another report (Arnalds, Svavarsdóttir, & Aradóttir, 
2010) shows that the vegetated area around Hálslón has suffered from Aeolian deposits that get 
suspended when the water levels in the reservoir drop. Damage to landscapes and geological 
formations is irreversible, as predicted (Einarsson, 2001). 
                                                          
28
 Previously, Jökulsá í Fljótsdal ran into Lake Lagarfljót, but now Jökulsá á Dal is also diverted into the lake.  The 
latter river is the murkiest of Iceland‘s glacial rivers (due to high concentration of suspended particles).  
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According to Hajer’s ADA, actors who participate in the discursive struggles that characterise 
environmental politics “seek to position others in a specific way” (1995:53) in order to gain or keep 
discursive dominance. It is clear that in the debate on Kárahnjúkar, the proponents of the energy 
sector attempted to frame any opposition as irrational and unjustified. Characterising critics as 
irrational is to render them unfit to partake in a political debate that is seemingly based on the 
exchange of rational arguments. Thus, depoliticization takes place through the exclusion of actors 
(critics) and arguments (framed as irrational) from the political arena. What remains is only what fits 
the dominant discourse which has emerged as the only remaining alternative.  
5.2.3 Hellisheiði Geothermal Plant  
“To deconstruct a policy discourse and find that it is to be understood as the unintended 
consequences of an interplay of actions is one thing, more interesting is to observe how 
seemingly technical positions conceal normative commitments.” (Hajer, 1995: 55) 
Contrary to expectations, Hellisheiði geothermal power plant did not turn out to be the success case 
it was expected to be. Problems have been experienced with earthquakes due to the pumping down 
of excess water (OR, 2012), H2S pollution in air and waterways in and around Reykjavík has become a 
health risk (Gunnarsson, Aradóttir, & Sigfússon, 2014; “Mengað affallsvatn í grunnvatni,” 2011) and 
other toxic emissions have killed moss and other vegetation around the power plant (EFLA, 2009). 
Finally, production capacity is falling, which is evidence for unsustainable resource use (Arnórsson, 
2012; No author, 2012), and only 12-15% of the energy tapped from the geothermal field is 
harnessed due to technical limitations – the rest is released as excess water and toxic emissions 
(Arnórsson, interview)(OR, 2013a). All of this has caused great financial problems for OR and the 
municipalities that own the company (OR, 2013a), which are eventually shouldered by the tax-payers 
of the three municipalities that own OR. 29  
But what went wrong at Hellisheiði? According to the company itself (OR, 2013a), the main problem 
is that expectations of generation capacity were founded on speculations and very limited empirical 
evidence of the capacity of the geothermal field (Hávarðsson, 2013; OR, 2013a). Geophycisist 
Sveinbjörn Björnsson (RÚV, 2013b) and geochemist Stefán Arnórsson (interview) concur, and add 
that scientists’ warnings regarding overexploitation of the resource were systematically ignored 
when the power plant was built. Furthermore, geothermal energy is in fact a non-renewable 
resource and energy extraction has to take that fact into account (Arnórsson, 2012; Pálmason, 2005; 
Sanyal, 2005). Arnórsson (interview) emphasises that geothermal energy should never be utilised for 
heavy industry, as was planned with the energy from Hellisheiði, because it is impossible to assert 
                                                          
29
 For a discussion of OR‘s financial situation, see (Sigmundsdóttir, 2009).  
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beforehand how much energy particular geothermal field will yield, although this is done repeatedly 
in Iceland.30  
In the case of Hellisheiði, OR simply treated the geothermal field as an inexhaustible reserve of 
“readily available” energy without supporting this perspective with scientific evidence. Arnórsson 
explains that the underlying problem is that computer modelling and abstract calculations have 
replaced geology as the scientific foundation of geothermal energy extraction: 
“It is impossible to treat these calculations as facts, but this is what they are doing. You cannot 
speculate, you have to measure, and you need the natural scientific background to know what 
to measure. *…+ These people, they don’t seem to think rationally. *…+ You see how I 
understand this, it’s all there on the table. But people don’t want to talk about it. I experience 
that very strongly, it’s as if they are scared shitless of me because they know that I know, 
having been involved in this for half a century. *…+ This is nonsense. This is not rational thinking. 
But people stubbornly defend themselves, and mostly with the silence.” (Arnórsson, interview) 
In short, the production capacity of the geothermal field in Hellisheiði was drastically over-estimated 
because expectations were built on speculations rather than scientific data. Critique was left 
unanswered or silenced, scientific knowledge selectively ignored and rationality suspended – all 
under the banner of economic growth. The result was an economic and environmental disaster.  
The experience with Hellisheiði geothermal plant is an indicator of how dominant the green-energy 
narrative is in Icelandic energy politics and demonstrative of the effects of carbon fetishism. Thus, 
assumptions about the capacity of the geothermal field in Hellisheiði were not just neutral 
calculations – they were based on normative commitments to expanding the energy sector without 
considering the limitations of the physical system itself, nor the potential environmental impacts of 
the energy production. This demonstrates the need for a more integrated approach to renewable 
energy projects. 
5.3 Critique from Alternative Story-lines 
In this section, I present some of the main points of contention between the green-energy narrative 
and its alternative story-lines31.  
                                                          
30
 The EU and the U.S. Ministry of Energy classify geothermal energy as a renewable resource but Arnórsson 
(2012: 91) has stated that “this classification is not based on the nature of this resource but a reflection of 
environmental policy”. 
31
 As mentioned earlier (chapter 5), I do not attempt to give a coherent idea of these alternative story-lines, but 
use them to draw out weaknesses in the green-energy narrative.  
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5.3.1 Nature as a Cultural Heritage 
One of the main criticisms of the green-energy narrative is rooted in a different view of nature, 
although also it is anthropocentric. Instead of valuing nature first and foremost as a source of 
economic prosperity and as a resource (i.e. use-value), an alternative perspective values nature as 
Icelanders’ source of freedom and identity and as the nation’s greatest cultural heritage. Nature has 
indeed shaped Icelanders’ identity (Árnason, 2005; Hálfdanarson & Karlsdóttir, 2005) and has in 
many ways come to represent Icelandicness (I. Á. Jóhannesson, 2005). In a 1997 survey on nature 
and national identity in Iceland and two other Nordic countries, the landscape was found to be the 
most important national symbol in Iceland (not in the other two countries) (Árnason, 2005: 112).  
I asked the people who participated in my questionnaire to describe it in a few words. The outcome 
is presented in the word cloud below.                        
 
Figure 10. Vastness captures both víðátta and víðerni, meaning “a land of distant views.” The 
words ósnortin and óspillt (pristine and unspoilt, respectively), are often used interchangeably 
in Icelandic.  
Further results from the survey also cast light on the participants’ perspectives on nature and 
specifically the status of the highlands: 
Questionnaire Question Agree or Strongly 
Agree 
2. Icelandic nature is characterised by unspoilt and undeveloped 
wilderness 
82% (28 out of 34) 
12. The Icelandic highlands have an important status in the country’s 
history and the nation’s identity 
91% (31 out of 34) 
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16. Future generations have the same rights to experience Icelandic 
nature and wilderness as previous generations.  
97% (33 out of 34) 
 
In view of this, nature should not be sacrificed thoughtlessly for energy generation (Karlsdóttir, 2010: 
31-35) as nothing less than Iceland’s cultural identity is at stake. The characteristics that make it 
unique and precious for Icelanders will vanish if too much land is dedicated to energy production (G. 
P. Ólafsson, 2007; Þórhallsdóttir, 2002)(Guðbrandsson, interview). When these perspectives are 
brought to the table in environmental debates, the proponents of the green-energy narrative have a 
very clear, succinct reply. 
“Having positive feelings about nature, that’s one thing. Being willing to make some 
sacrifices, that’s another thing…” (Jóhannesson, interview) 
In other words, sacrificing some of nature for energy generation is framed as an unavoidable trade-
off, with an implicit reference to the prosperity energy generation provides. This serves to silence 
criticism and positions those who are critical of the energy sector as uncompromising and unrealistic. 
It also implies that there is no choice in this matter. The socially and ideologically homogenising 
impacts of the post-political condition are evident. Of course, what this conceals is the choice that 
has already been made by those who are in power, namely to expand the energy sector at the cost of 
nature.  
5.3.2 Scarce Abundance  
The prevailing view in Iceland has been that the country’s resources are “just about inexhaustible” 
and can be harnessed ad infinitum (Hálfdanarson, interview). It is clear that within the energy sector, 
the prospect of radically expanding the sector is viewed very positively (Askja Energy, n.d.; 
Landsvirkjun, 2007; Orkuspárnefnd, 2013). However, this view is increasingly questioned and 
criticised. Þórhallsdóttir (interview) stated that “many Icelanders have an unrealistic valuation of our 
resources, especially those harnessed for energy generation.” Furthermore, people think these 
resources are “much more abundant than they are”. Estimates by authorities of exploitable 
hydropower of 30 TWh/yr with due consideration of environmental consequences (The Ministry of 
Industry, 1994) have particularly been under attack for being unrealistic (Einarsson, 2009; Magnason, 
2007).  
“If you look at the estimation of hydropower for energy generation then it’s often stated that 
we have 37-40 TWh/yr *…+ and that’s a completely absurd number. […+ It’s sometimes added 
that this is the technically exploitable energy and some even say that this is what we can exploit 
after taking nature protection into consideration. On the other hand, if you calculate the 
energy that this water [that can be technically harnessed] can generate then you can get up to 
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20 TWh/yr, or a little bit more than that. You can’t get up to 30 unless you mean to harness 
almost everything *all the glacial rivers+. And then you’re also going to harness the water from 
practically every salmon-river in the country. *…+  
 
The numbers that people are throwing out there, the ministers of industry, Landsvirkjun, the 
engineering firms, the President, they’re way too high, they’re completely unrealistic, and 
when you ask these people to explain on paper how they reach this number they can’t do it.” 
(Þórhallsdóttir, interview) 
Obviously, estimates and perspectives of the most powerful actors in the energy sector are 
considered to be “unrealistic” by Þórhallsdóttir, who has been involved in the work on the Master 
Plan since 1999 (also, Gíslason, interview; Finnsson, interview; Guðbrandsson, interview).  
With regards to geothermal energy, authorities have estimated up to 20 TWh/yr for electricity 
generation (The Ministry of Industry, 1994). This would represent a quadrupling of the current 
production of 5.2 TWh/yr. According to geochemist Stefán Arnórsson (interview), such estimates of 
geothermal energy are “impossible” because the production capacity of geothermal fields can only 
become quantifiable through a long-term experience with utilising the resource, which has to come 
about in many small steps (see also Arnórsson, 2012; Pálmason, 2005) .32  
Additionally, the work carried out under the Master Plan for hydro and geothermal energy in Iceland 
gives reason to doubt that Iceland has many options left for large-scale energy production 
(Rammaáætlun, 2011)(see also Einarsson, 2009). Yet, the government’s will in this matter is clear. 
Árnadóttir, Minister of Industry, stated that Iceland has a great deal of untapped potential in terms 
of energy generation, adding that “we just have to reach some sort of reconciliation in society” 
(Árnadóttir, interview).  
What does reconciliation denote in this context? Judging from the way the energy companies and 
the authorities frame it, and in view of their policies, reconciliation can only mean convincing those 
who oppose further energy development that this way forward is without alternative. On the 
surface, such aspirations appear democratic as there is no application of brute force as a way of 
silencing criticism. Rather, the strategy entails establishing “a widespread agreement over existing 
conditions and appropriate action” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 215), which has to a large degree been 
established in Iceland. This exemplifies how cultural hegemony works not only through coercion, but 
also consent.  
Further, this marks the depoliticization of the discourse on energy and environment in Iceland by 
indicating that the struggles and disputes that inevitably arise given the fundamentally different 
                                                          
32
 Furthermore, harnessing geothermal energy is essentially mining of heat and it is therefore impossible to 
make long-term estimates for energy production (Arnórsson, interview)(see also Arnórsson, 2012). 
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views on the expansion of the energy sector become obsolete in face of the abundance of the 
natural resources. This perceived abundance stands in stark contrast to the sense of scarcity the 
capitalistic logic dictates us to maintain. Not conquering this readily available El Dorado of energy 
resources thus becomes an act of carelessness if not irresponsibility.  
5.3.3 Economic Perspective  
A study published in 2009 finds that investments in heavy-industry in Iceland yield much lower 
returns than other industries or 1,7% compared to 3,8% (Sjónarrönd, 2009).  
In a report on the returns of Landsvirkjun’s electricity sale to heavy-industry, it was found that the 
company’s returns were not adequate after tax and inflation had been deduced (Á. Jónsson & 
Jóhannesson, 2012; “Stóriðja borgar fjórðung af því orkuverði sem heimili borga,” 2010). 
Additionally, Landsvirkjun, e.g. in the case of Kárahnjúkar power project, bears a large part of the 
investment risk. This is because the already low electricity prices to Alcoa are also tied to the world 
market price of aluminium (Á. Jónsson & Jóhannesson, 2012). The current CEO of Landsvirkjun has 
stated that the returns of the Kárahnjúkar power project were unacceptable and the electricity price 
too low (“Arðsemi Kárahnjúkavirkjunar,” 2011, “Of lítil arðsemi af virkjunum,” 2011). 
The electricity prices are so low that Icelandic tax-payers are in fact subsidising electricity for heavy 
industry, and some conclude that the sector has resulted in great financial losses for the nation, and 
not profits (Siglaugsson, 1999)(Þorláksson, 2009). Other studies indicate that the only net financial 
benefits from the heavy industry sector are taxes paid by the aluminium companies, altogether an 
equivalent of ca. 0.3% of GNP. The financial profits from harnessing Iceland’s resources thus mostly 
ends up with the owners of the aluminium companies (Þorláksson, 2009).33  
OR, the company that owns the geothermal plant in Hellisheiði, has also suffered financial losses 
since it began expanding its electricity production for heavy industry (Pétursdóttir, Ólafsdóttir, 
Kristmundsson, & Reynisson, 2012). OR had for decades been financially stable and yielded profits 
for its owners. In the early 2000s it began producing electricity for heavy industry and took high loans 
in foreign currency (Ibid.). These loans have multiplied since the economic crisis hit and OR’s debts 
now stand at 216 billion ISK, or ca. 1.3 billion Euros (OR, 2013b).  
It thus seems contradictory to argue for the expansion of the energy sector based on economic gains 
for the nation. Yet, when the energy sector fails to deliver its promises of prosperity, the green-
                                                          
33
 Other studies, e.g. (Harðarson, 1998), have shown economic benefits from heavy-industry. However, 
Harðarson, who wrote his report for Landsvirkjun, has been criticised for excluding factors from his 
methodology and accounting in order to yield specific results. See e.g. (Þorláksson, 2009). 
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energy narrative remains, by and large, intact. The concept of cultural hegemony can help explain 
this contradiction. One of Gramsci’s insights is that the establishment of hegemony brings about the 
universalising of the interest and perspectives of a ruling-class. The green-energy narrative serves to 
legitimise its claims and actions and create a sense of common interests and unity of aims, namely 
that energy production benefits the whole nation. Icelanders have in many ways consented to this 
view, as is demonstrated for example by the fact that the two political parties who have been central 
in the creation and maintenance of the green-energy narrative have been in power for the most part 
since 1991. Maintaining the green-energy narrative in the face of evidence of broken promises is 
proof of its hegemonic status.  
5.4 Future Direction  
“There will never be enough energy” (ES, interview) 
A comprehensive assessment of the future development of the energy sector in Iceland is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. However, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions based on how 
actors within the green-energy narrative (the discourse-coalition) approach and interpret the Master 
Plan (see chapter 4.2.1), which represents the framework policy for environmental protection and 
resource utilisation in Iceland (Master Plan, n.d.) 
According to the law 48/2011 on the Master Plan (Alþingi, 2011), a process of declaring an area 
protected shall begin as soon as Alþingi has legislated the Master Plan. UST is responsible for this 
process (UST, n.d.). The outcome of the second phase of the Master Plan was adopted by Alþingi on 
January 14, 2013 (RÚV, 2013a). A year later, the government announced budget cuts to UST and 
subsequently no money was assigned to the department responsible for declaring areas as 
protected, compared to 34 million ISK (ca. 2 million SEK) in 2013. Evidently, this was a stumbling 
block for the protection process.  
On March 10, 2014, Orkustofnun sent a list to the Ministry of Environment with 91 potential power 
projects to be treated during the 3rd phase of the Master Plan (Orkustofnun, 2014b). Of these, 19 had 
been classified as protected in the 2nd phase.  
This sparked a huge outcry within the environmental movement and among politicians in the 
government opposition, e.g. the former Minister of Environment Svandís Svavarsdóttir. She had 
claimed earlier that it violated the law on the Master Plan) to re-introduce power projects from the 
protection category to the next phase (Svavarsdóttir, 2013). Other politicians claimed Orkustofnun’s 
proposal was “crazy” and a “political scandal” (RÚV, 2014i) and Landvernd’s CEO Guðmundur I. 
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Guðbrandsson said the protection process had now been “castrated” (RÚV, 2014h) and that this was 
an attack on Icelandic nature (Guðbrandsson, interview). Many thus perceived Orkustofnun’s list as a 
licence for full exploitation of Iceland’s nature.  
Orkustofnun’s director Guðni A. Jóhannesson responded that it was Orkustofnun’s legal duty to “look 
to the future” and to propose new projects, notably also those in the protection category that had 
not yet been declared protected (process has started, but not been signed). He further added that 
the laws on the Master Plan decreed this (RÚV, 2014g). The Minister of Industry agreed with 
Jóhannesson and Orkustofnun on this interpretation and claimed that it was “reasonable” to assume 
that future generations could re-evaluate the feasibility of the power projects in light of e.g. “new 
technology” and new methods of implementation (RÚV, 2014f).  
The Master Plan had originally been framed as an attempt to establish a consensus between the 
interests of protection and of utilisation in Iceland. However, if the projects in the protection 
category will continuously be re-submitted every phase or every generation, while the projects that 
come into operation fall outside the scope of the Master Plan, then the balance between utilisation 
and protection is skewed.34 This signifies only one thing: The debate on resource use in Iceland is 
reduced to when and how and not if Iceland’s rivers and geothermal fields will be harnessed.  
The work on the Master Plan, or particular struggles in relation to it, clearly reveal growth’s cultural 
hegemony in environmental politics in Iceland. It demonstrates that progress is interpreted as 
growing the economy, and the project of modernisation as a continuing expansion of the energy 
sector without questioning the consumption of energy. The value of nature is becoming ever more 
evident in Iceland, but nature protection remains a dispensable sub-category to economic growth.  
These trends raise serious questions regarding Iceland’s future. How many more rivers and 
geothermal fields will Icelanders sacrifice for the green-washing of aluminium companies?  Will 
‘wilderness’ only be preserved in isolated patches for tourism purposes and how will that affect 
Icelanders’ relationship with the land? What will happen, when climate change has eaten up the 
glaciers and, thereby, the glacial rivers?  
The answers to these questions depend on whether our thirst for energy will ever be saturated or 
not.  
                                                          
34
 In other words, the centre of the graph in Figure 6 (chapter 4.2.1) will gradually move towards the bottom 
left corner, thus distorting perceptions of acceptable negative impacts of energy development.  
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6. Discussion 
My analysis of the discourse on energy and the environment in Iceland revealed the hegemonic 
status of a story-line I call the green-energy narrative. As became evident, this story-line is heavily 
influenced by EM. Its logic is translated into the continuous expansion of the energy sector at the 
cost of sensitive environmental areas.  
6.1 Deconstructing the Story-line 
In this section, I deconstruct the green-energy narrative, first by summarising the inherent 
contradictions that were identified in the analysis. Afterwards, it will be discussed with help of the 
critical concepts introduced above (chapter 3.4).  
6.1.1 Inherent Contradictions and False Promises of the Green-energy Narrative 
Economic Gains for the Nation 
The expansion of the energy sector in Iceland has always been justified with reference to economic 
gains for the nation. However, creating measurable profits for the nation has not been achieved in 
the expansion of the sector (chapter 5.3.3) and some of the energy companies have become a 
financial burden for Icelandic tax-payers.  
Rationality vs. Irrationality 
Actors within the green-energy narrative claim to be guided by rationality and accuse others of being 
irrational and sentimental (chapter 5.2.2). Yet, decisions are often founded on the suspension of 
rational thinking and a selective adoption of expert advice (chapter 5.2.1). What is more, it is hard to 
see how a logic that leads to overexploitation of resources, acts on speculation and risk-friendly 
decision making can be framed as rational. The polemic response to criticism (see poster campaign in 
chapter 5.2.2) furthermore underlines that the green-energy narrative avoids engaging with 
arguments in a rational manner. The persistence of the green-energy narrative illustrates the power 
of the discourse to influence thinking and decisions regardless of environmental degradation or loss.  
The GHG Paradox and Failed Responses 
Iceland seeks to reduce global concentrations of GHGs by radically increasing its emissions. This logic 
could only hold if the global CO2 emissions decreased or increased less as a result of this. The 
Icelandic energy sector does not attempt to prove that this is the case – perhaps because of the 
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complexity of the issue. It can neither be proven nor disproven. As such, claims of abstract GHG 
reduction are essentially meaningless, but serve to green-wash a growth-seeking energy sector.    
Green Energy and Destruction of Environment: Local Impacts 
HGE in Iceland is described as green and environmentally friendly. However, the local consequences 
of energy production tell a different story (chapter 5.2). What becomes evident is an institutionalised 
acceptance of the severe environmental impacts renewable energy production can have.  
Tautology: Recognition of Green Becomes Justification 
The green label attached to the Icelandic energy sector is justified with a tautological argument. On 
the basis of lower GHG emissions from renewable energies, Iceland managed to have a special 
decision adopted into the Kyoto Protocol through diplomatic efforts, allowing the country to increase 
emissions from heavy-industry. Today, this international recognition is used as an argument to show 
how green the Icelandic energy sector is. 
To conclude, these inherent contradictions of the green-energy narrative suggest a fundamental flaw 
in its internal logic and ability to produce results that live up to its own promises.  
6.1.2 Theoretically Informed Criticism 
Depoliticization 
As shown (chapter 5.2.1, 5.3.1 and 5.3.2), the green-energy narrative is largely depoliticized. As such, 
it prevents a democratic debate about the role of the energy sector and conceals the fact that there 
is fundamental disagreement among Icelanders on what to do with the country’s natural resources.  
The green-energy narrative’s success derives partly from its flexible and multi-faceted character. It 
appropriates potentially critical discourses and views, e.g. the sustainability discourse and concerns 
over clashes between nature protection and energy generation, rather than openly opposing them. 
“We are all nature protectionists now”, the Minister of Industry told me (Árnadóttir, interview). This 
colonisation of the concept of nature protection serves to make alternative views redundant.  
I do not think this comment is meant to deceit or mislead. My experience from conducting interviews 
with the narrative-supporters revealed no harmful intentions. Rather, I see this as evidence of how 
convincing and attractive the green-energy narrative actually is. It is, in fact, a belief system 
(Christoff, 1996). Not only does it prevent us from questioning its assumptions, but it silences critical 
voices throughout society.  
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Carbon fetishism 
A decontextualized focus on CO2 emissions has further led to a silencing of alternative responses to 
fighting climate change in Iceland, e.g. responses that aim at directly reducing Iceland’s ecological 
footprint through addressing consumption rather than increasing it (Moolna, 2012; Swyngedouw, 
2010). This, I argue, is a clear case of carbon fetishism, whereby renewable energy sources become 
good per se and trade-offs fall out of sight. Simultaneously, the dominant interests of the energy 
sector are further solidified and expansion becomes the only alternative.  
Additionally, the green image of the energy sector has started acting as an absolution for Icelanders. 
We use it to justify our high levels of per-head energy consumption, we make no efforts to save 
energy although saving targets similar to the ones of the EU would result in energy gains equivalent 
to the production from an average power station in Iceland (Sveinsson, interview). Few nations own 
as many cars and drive as much per capita as Icelanders and food waste is excessive. To appease our 
conscience, we simply remind each other that our energy is green, that we are doing the world a 
favour, and all is well. This silences questions about the actual impact of our actions or the embodied 
emissions in the goods we consume. 
I agree with Swyngedouw (Swyngedouw, 2013) that the current climate change consensus as 
operationalised through EM is radically reactionary. It strives for radical change – e.g. a carbon-
neutral energy regime - but dares not to critically question the premises of the current energy 
regime. Its depoliticized character forecloses alternative views from gaining ground, e.g. in Iceland 
where ideas about deciding to stop damming and rather go for reducing energy consumption are 
publicly ridiculed and coined “regressive”. Meanwhile, the world’s (and Iceland’s) GHG emissions rise 
steadily and other environmental concerns remain marginalised.  
6.2 EM and the Icelandic Case: Limits to Growth (on a finite island) 
What remains untouched and unquestioned in Icelandic energy and environmental policies is the 
capitalistic paradigm of growth. Orkustofnun, the government and other actors in the green-energy 
narrative are fully committed to a world where there will never be enough energy and where 
economic growth is the only real foundation for prosperity, which is demonstrated by their 
statements, actions and execution of policies.  
Another influence of EM on energy policies in Iceland is the belief that ecology and the economy can 
be reconciled and that pressure on the environmental systems can be considerably lowered. In 
Iceland, this is translated into the perspective that nature protection and harnessing resources can 
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go together. The empirical evidence tells a different story: Ecosystems collapse, lakes are polluted, 
air pollution and chemicals cause respiratory problems, resources are depleted, landscapes lost. Yet, 
the energy is marketed as green and destruction is coined as the inevitable progress of modernity. In 
short, EM failed to keep its promise of reconciling environment and economy.  
The case of the Icelandic energy sector demonstrates how the global problem of climate change gets 
translated through the lens of EM into local responses. These responses, as suggested by EM, are 
technological fix (as HGE in theory replaces carbon-based energy elsewhere) and growth, decoupled 
from resource use. Neither turns out to be successful in tackling the global problem they were 
designed for: There is no evidence that the alleged reduction in CO2 emissions from aluminium 
manufacturing in Iceland is anything but redundant in the global context of GHG emissions.  
Finally, the question of what to do when the last rivers and geothermal fields have been harnessed in 
Iceland does not surface because EM implies the omnipotent ability of technology to eliminate 
scarcity. It thus ignores the boundaries of the physical system it depends on. If Iceland’s green energy 
system is a showcase for the rest of the world, as Icelandic authorities claim, then EM seems unable 
to create an economic system that stays within the planetary boundaries.  
6.3 Growth’s Cultural Hegemony 
I believe the green-energy narrative derives its dominance from its multi-faceted character and its 
ability to operate on all levels of social life and thought in Iceland. It provides us with the vocabulary 
to interpret economic, cultural and political issues, e.g. Iceland’s rise from poverty to prosperity and 
independence, views on nature and resources and Iceland’s role in a world fighting global 
environmental problems. It sets the norms and rules of society and defines what can be conceived as 
acceptable or logical actions. Thus it tells us that the appropriate response to a problem created by 
growth and consumption is more growth, more consumption; energy with a different face for the 
good of all.  
This message is not fed to our intellect but our morals, which directs our attention away from the 
materiality of energy production. Thus, the question of how to treat nature and resources is elevated 
from the level of political struggles over the order of society, to a level of moral calling for all 
Icelanders. When conflicts arise nonetheless, e.g. regarding the Master Plan or Kárahnjúkavirkjun, 
the green-energy narrative responds not by engaging in a political debate but by undermining the 
validity of opposing claims (see chapter 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).  
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Why, in the face of its inherent contradictions and failed promises, does the green-energy narrative 
persist? The answer, to me, is simple: Because we maintain it. We are not ready to let go of its 
promises quite yet, and willingly consent to its worldview. This is partly because cultural hegemony 
conceals certain conflicts. In Iceland, the question of intra-generational distribution of benefits from 
energy expansion goes largely unaddressed in debates on energy and nature. And, similarly, who is it 
really that profits? 
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7. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have analysed the discourse on energy in Iceland and revealed the hegemonic status 
of a story-line I call the green-energy narrative. I have studied the normative commitments 
underlying this story-line and shown that it is heavily influenced by EM. Furthermore, my analysis 
shows how the story-line is reproduced in policies, actions and debates on energy in Iceland and that 
it drives the material expansion of the energy sector.  
My contribution lies mainly in two areas. First of all, I have contributed to a better understanding of 
the power relations and implicit assumptions that drive the expansion of the energy sector in 
Iceland. Secondly, I have demonstrated that there is a need to critically study how transformations 
towards renewable energy take place elsewhere and that environmental concerns that do not evolve 
around CO2 need to be put on the agenda if we are to address sustainability.  
The case of Iceland underlines the importance of approaching sustainability from an integrated 
perspective. A focus on one aspect, such as CO2 emissions, can blind us to other problems that 
equally merit consideration. Discourse is powerful in creating this blindness and allowing 
unsustainable practices to be pushed through under the guise of greening, in this case the greening 
of energy production.  
My implicit objective in this thesis was to better understand environmental politics in Iceland with 
the hope of locating potential entry-points for change. What I have found is this: Environmental 
politics and debates on energy in Iceland cannot be reduced to argumentative struggles, as Hajer 
would have it. Argumentative struggles rely on the condition that actors engage in argument with 
each other, and there must be a content that can be argued either for or against. Neither applies to 
the green-energy narrative, whose actors evade political conflicts and fail to recognise the normative 
and often contradictory foundation of their worldview.   
I thus do not believe alternative views will gain prominence – neither in Iceland nor elsewhere – 
simply by winning the argument. Rather, a fight for an alternative reality, one that is sensitive to 
physical limits, must take place on all the levels where hegemony functions and is reproduced – in all 
areas of social life, in our thoughts, norms and beliefs.   
A change is needed, for there is much to lose from continuing the status-quo, and much to gain from 
breaking with it. For Iceland, this is a question of putting all its wilderness to energy development or 
not. For the world, this involves either success or failure in remaining within the delicate balance of 
planetary boundaries.   
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7.1 Further Research Orientations  
I have indirectly offered insights on Icelandic politics, although my focus was not on political culture. 
Further research on energy development in Iceland in relation to the country’s political culture would 
be enlightening. 
I have also dealt indirectly with questions of inter-generational justice by looking into preservation of 
nature for future generations. However, I did not engage in a discussion about intra-generational 
justice as I did not in any depth investigate how financial benefits from the expansion of the energy 
sector are distributed. These issues are important and more research could be interesting.  
Iceland’s energy-landscape might be changing: The selling of green certificates to EU member states 
is expected to grow in the next years, there are plans to build a deep-sea cable to the UK to connect 
Iceland to other energy grids, and, finally, Icelanders are embarking on oil drilling off the coast of 
northeast Iceland. All these issues could have contradictory impacts on the Icelandic energy system 
and nature and would be interesting research topics for the future.  
Finally, more research on marginalised environmental consequences is needed in other countries or 
areas where a ‘successful’ transformation has been made to renewable energy.  
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Appendix I 
This questionnaire was carried out in Reykjavík, Iceland, on March 6th and 7th 2014. I randomly 
approached potential participants in public spaces, i.e. coffee shops and book shops. I did not 
attempt an in-depth analysis of the data, e.g. by accounting for gender, age or occupation. This might 
have been interesting with a bigger sample. The questionnaire results are only meant as supportive 
data in my thesis. See outcome from question 21 in the wordcloud in chapter 5.3.1 in my thesis. 
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Questionnaire: Data Collection for a Master‘s Thesis  
This questionnaire is carried out as a part of data collection for a master thesis in Environmental 
Studies and Sustainability Science at Lund University, Sweden. The main focus of the project is energy 
production in Iceland and prevailing views among Icelanders on energy and nature.  
As a valuable addition to other data, the results of this questionnaire will form the basis of the 
analysis in my thesis, although the results will not be traceable to any one participant. However, if 
you are interested in the topic and/or want to know more, you are welcome to leave your e-mail 
below and I will contact you when the thesis has been made accessible online on Lund University‘s 
website. You can also contact me at hronn.boa@gmail.com should any questions concerning this 
questionnaire arise. 
Thank you for participating! 
Background information 
Age      □ <18  □ 18-34   □ 34-50 □ 51-64 □ 65+ 
Gender  □ Female □ Male □ Other 
Occupation    ___________________________________ 
E-mail    ___________________________________ 
 
Please fill out the form below by indicating what describes your own opinion the best.  
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 In general, Icelanders are aware of 
environmental issues and nature 
conservation. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
2 Icelandic nature is characterised by 
unspoilt and undeveloped wilderness. □ □ □ □ □ 
3 Hydro and geothermal energy are 
renewable and environmentally sound 
energy sources.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
4 There is a big untapped potential for new 
power generation projects in Iceland.   □ □ □ □ □ 
5 It is necessary to sustain economic 
growth to ensure prosperity in Iceland. □ □ □ □ □ 
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6 Icelandic authorities prioritise sustainable 
use of resources and nature 
conservation. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
7 Iceland is at the forefront of 
environmental issues in the world.  □ □ □ □ □ 
8 Energy production in Iceland is 
sustainable. □ □ □ □ □ 
9 It is justifiable to harness more energy in 
the highlands if the economic benefits of 
doing so are high. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
10 Energy production from hydro and 
geothermal energy does not harm 
Icelandic nature. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
11 Nature conservation/protection? and the 
utilisation of land for energy generation 
go together in Iceland.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
12 The Icelandic highlands have an 
important status in the country‘s history 
and the nation‘s identity. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
13 Iceland‘s use of hydro and geothermal 
energy contributes to global reduction of 
GHGs.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
14 It is necessary to start new power 
generation projects to ensure quality of 
life in Iceland.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
15 Outside of Iceland, the country has an 
image of unspoilt wilderness and 
magnificent nature.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
16 Future generations have the same rights 
to experience Icelandic nature and 
wilderness as previous generations.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
17 Climate change threatens Iceland‘s 
prosperity.  □ □ □ □ □ 
18 All Icelanders profit from the harnessing 
of natural resources for power 
generation.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
19 In general, Icelanders are well informed 
about the environmental issues of 
resource utilisation.    
□ □ □ □ □ 
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20 I am well informed about the 
environmental issues of resource 
utilisation. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
21 What characterises Icelandic nature? 
Please write 2-3 words.  
     
 
 
Questionnaire Results 
QQ SD (%) D (%) N (%) A (%) SA (%) Total 
1 2 (6) 11 (32,5) 4 (12) 17 (50) 0 (0) 34 
2 1 (3) 0 (0) 5 (14,5) 25 (73,5) 3 (9) 34 
3 1 (3) 3 (9) 6 (17) 17 (50) 7 (20,5) 34 
4 2 (6) 8 (23,5) 8 (23,5) 12 (35,5) 4 (12) 34 
5 0 (0) 3 (9) 7 (21) 16 (48,5) 7 (21) 33 
6 10 (29,5) 12 (35,5) 8 (23,5) 3 (9) 1 (3) 34 
7 5 (20,5) 11 (32,5) 10 (29,5) 7 (20,5) 1 (3) 34 
8 3 (23,5) 4 (12) 8 (23,5) 17 (50) 2 (6) 34 
9 12 (34,5)  9 (26,5) 3 (9) 7 (20,5) 3 (9) 34 
10 9 (27,5) 14 (42,5) 4 (12) 3 (9) 3 (9) 33 
11 3 (9) 14 (41) 10 (29,5) 3 (9) 3 (9) 34 
12 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (9) 16 (47) 15 (44) 34 
13 1 (3) 7 (22) 11 (34,5) 11 (34,5) 4 (12,5) 32 
14 12 (35,5) 12 (35,5) 4 (12) 4 (12) 2 (6) 34 
15 0 (44) 1 (3) 4 (12) 19 (56) 10 (29,5) 34 
16 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (3) 12 (35,5) 21 (62) 34 
17 1 (3) 2 (6) 8 (23,5) 14 (41) 9 (26,5) 34 
18 4 (12) 4 (12) 11 (32,5) 10 (29,5) 5 (14,5) 34 
19 5 (14,5) 16 (47) 7 (20,5) 5 (14,5) 1 (3) 34 
20 1 (3) 2 (6) 15 (44) 9 (26,5) 7 (20,5) 34 
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Appendix II 
As indicated below, interviews were conducted in Reykjavík and Borgarnes, Iceland, from February 
24 to March 11.  
The interview guide changed slightly from one interview to the other, as I conducted semi-structured 
and open-ended interviews. However, these key themes were discussed to some extend in all 
interviews.  
 
Interview Guide and overview of interviews 
Key Q1: What is the general attititude in Iceland towards the country‘s resources (hydro and 
geothermal)?  
o What characterises energy production in Iceland? How would you describe it? 
o If interviewees use the terms sustainable, renewable, green, clean, environmentally friendly, 
ask them to explain in more detail what they mean.   
Key Q2: What were the main historic drivers behind the development of the sector and what are 
the main drivers today? 
o Are there any specific economic factors that played in? 
o Are there any specific political and/or cultural/historical factors? 
Key Q3: Has this development been a success story? Have we been successful? 
o Do we use the energy responsibly/well?  
o Is the energy still ‘green’ if is used to produce materials/metals that are not used 
sustainably? 
Key Q4: What characterises energy politics and policies in Iceland?  
o Where would you situate Iceland with respect to other countries in terms of sustainability 
and environmental protection? (I rarely posed this question, I sort of forgot it. Though I think 
most of my interviewees discussed this a bit).  
Key Q5: What is the general attitude towards/view on nature in Iceland? 
o How do Icelanders view the highlands? 
Key Q6: To your mind, can energy extraction and protection go together? Why/why not?  
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o Does it go together in the highlands? 
Key Q7: Are there any conflicts in Iceland on HGE projects?  
o What trade-offs are brought up in the debate?  
o How would you characterise opposing views?  
o Are there any specific cases of conflicts that have been defining in some way for energy 
production and/or the environmental movement? 
o How do you view Rammaáætlun (the Master Plan) – is it an attempt to reconcile opposing 
views?  
Key Q8: How do you perceive the future development of the Icelandic energy sector?  
o Will there ever be enough energy produced? 
o What is it that really makes a society or its energy use sustainable?  
o What are we striving for (by harnessing HGE)? What sort of future are we trying to establish 
for Iceland – for the world?  
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Interview Overview 
  Location Date Organization Position Time  
1 Árni Finnsson Reykjavík 27 February Iceland Nature 
Conservation 
Association
35
 
President 60 min  In person 
2 Guðmundur Ingi Guðbrandsson Reykjavík 4 March The Icelandic 
Environment 
Association
36
 
CEO 50 min In person 
3 Þorbjörg Sandra Bakke Reykjavík 24 February Grugg – 
Environmental 
Network 
Active member 60 min In person 
4 Guðni A. Jóhannesson Reykjavík 28 February National Energy 
Authority
37
 
General Director  35 min In person 
5 Kristinn Einarsson Reykjavík 28 February National Energy 
Authority 
Senior Manager  45 min In person 
6 Ragnheiður Ólafsdóttir Reykjavík 3 March National Power 
Company of 
Iceland
38
 
Environmental 
Manager 
70 min In person 
7 Óli Grétar B. Sveinsson Reykjavík 5 March National Power 
Company of 
Iceland 
 
Executive Vice 
President 
60 min In person 
                                                          
35
 Náttúruverndarsamtök Íslands. http://natturuvernd.is/English.  
36
 Landvernd. http://landvernd.is/en.  
37
 Orkustofnun. Government agency under the ministry of industry. http://www.nea.is/the-national-energy-authority/.  
38
 Landsvirkjun. 100% state run, main electricity provider in Iceland (over 70% share). http://www.landsvirkjun.com/.  
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8 Kjartan Sigurjónsson Reykjavík 27 February Landsnet
39
 Transmission 
System Operator 
60 min On the phone 
9 Ragnheiður Elín Árnadóttir & 
Helga Barðadóttir 
Reykjavík 4 March Ministry of 
Industry and 
Commmerce
40
 
Minister of 
Industry and 
Commerce (REÁ) & 
Senior Expert, 
Energy Affairs (HB) 
30 min In person 
10 ES Reykjavík 7 March Ministry of 
Industry and 
Commerce. Dep. 
of Ind. and Energy 
Senior Advisor. 
Energy Markets & 
Infrastructure 
45 min In person 
11 JG Reykjavík 11 March Ministry of 
Environment. Dep. 
of Land and Nat. 
Heritage 
Director 
General/specialist 
in env. resource 
management 
30 min In person 
12 Ketill Sigurjónsson Reykjavík 3 March Askja Energy
41
 Managing partner 60 min In person 
13 Svandís Svavarsdóttir Reykjavík 7 March Left-Green Party. 
Icelandic 
Parliament. 
Previous Minister 
of Environment 
and Natural 
Resources (2009-
2013). MP 
60 min In person 
14 Stefán Gíslason Borgarnes 5 March The Master Plan 
for Hydro and 
Geothermal 
Energy 
Head of the 
steering 
committee of the 
Master Plan, 3
rd
 
phase.
42
 
120 min In person 
                                                          
39
 Landsnet operates Iceland‘s electricity transmission system. http://www.landsnet.is/english.  
40
 Falls under the Ministry of Industries and Innovation 
41
Icelandic energy consulting firm. http://askjaenergy.org/about/askja-energy-partners/.  
42
 Rammaáætlun: the Icelandic Master Plan for Hydro and Geothermal Energy Resources. http://www.rammaaaetlun.is/english.  
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15 Þóra Ellen Þórhallsdóttir Reykjavík 25 February University of 
Iceland & Master 
Plan 
Expert on the 
steering 
committee of the 
Master Plan 
60 min In person 
16 Guðmundur Hálfd.son Reykjavík 26 February University of 
Iceland 
Historian 60 min In person 
17 Stefán Arnórsson Reykjavík 4 March University of 
Iceland 
Geochemist
43
 90 min In person 
                                                          
43
 Stefán has also been involved with the Master Plan and is on the board of Landsvirkjun.  
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Appendix III 
Argumentative Discourse Analysis 
I will apply the argumentative approach to discourse analysis (ADA) developed by Hajer (1995) for my 
analysis of the discourse on energy in Iceland. A basic tenet of ADA is that discourse is constitutive of 
reality and, as a consequence, environmental conflicts are not just conflicts over what action should 
be taken, but conflicts “over the meaning of physical and social phenomena” (Hajer, 1995: 72).  
Hajer builds his approach on a transformational model of social reality in which society is reproduced 
through interaction between agents and structures. Interaction, to a great extent, takes place 
through discourse, in which language has a central role. Hajer, following Foucault, does not interpret 
language or discourse as a mere set of tools, but “a specific communicative practice which influences 
the perception of interest and preferences” (1995: 59). It follows that interests are not given, but 
“intersubjectively constitutive through discourse” (Ibid.: 59), so the use of language can actually 
create new meanings and alter people’s cognition and identities.  
In light of this, Hajer directs ADA towards analysis of discursive interaction and discursive practices 
and argues that the power structures of society should be studied through discourse (1995: 55). In 
order to do so, and to explain how discourse is reflected in/relates to action, Hajer introduces two 
analytical concepts, or middle-range concepts as he calls them (they show how discursive orders are 
maintained and transformed). The first one is the concept of story-line. 
Story-lines are narratives on social reality that act as points of reference and allude to a common 
understanding of a phenomenon, e.g. environmental problems. Hajer defines them as “a generative 
sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to 
specific physical or social phenomena” (p. 56) and claims that in terms of analysis, story-lines help 
make sense of how discursive domination is established. His assumption is that political power of a 
discourse does not depend on the consistency of the story-line but rather its multi-interpretability, 
meaning that it can be adopted by various actors who have different world-views and might 
otherwise disagree on the details.  
For Hajer, story-lines are powerful political devices and the key-element in ADA. They function as 
metaphors in debates; they cluster knowledge and position actors and they reduce the complexity of 
topics so that it becomes intelligible to a broad audience. As they gain acceptance, “they gain a ritual 
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character” (1995: 63) and provide different people, e.g. the activist, the politician or the scientist, 
with a narrative that “sounds right” and makes the puzzles fall together.  
The second middle-range concept is discourse-coalition. Hajer defines them as an ensemble of a 
story-line, the actors who use it and the practices is which this takes place. In other words, discourse-
coalitions form around story-lines, specifically if the story-line has bearings in terms of policies and 
political projects. Discourse-coalitions do not unite around interests or ideologies, but story-lines – 
this suggests looking for politics in new places.  
A central theme of ADA is that Hajer views politics as a struggle for discursive hegemony, where 
hegemony constitutes securing support for and acceptance of a particular definition of reality 
(conveyed through story-line). He sees discursive hegemony as reached under two conditions, 
discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation, which in turn rely on three criteria. Thus, a 
specific definition of reality has to be credible so that actors have faith in/believe in it, acceptability 
requires that the position appears necessary and attractive, and the account must be trustworthy 
enough so that any doubts or uncertainties remain suppressed. 
Furthermore, once a story-line has gained enough support from a varied discourse coalition, it can 
start generating political effects (Hajer, 1995: 12-13). 
 
 
 
